Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

1998

State of Utah, Department of Human Services, ex
rel., State of Pennsylvania, ex rel., Robin Kirby v. Avi
Alex Jacoby : Brief of Appellee
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
A. Alexander Jacoby.
Lynn Nicholas; Jan Graham; Assistant Attorney General; Attorneys for Appellees.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, State of Utah v. Jacoby, No. 980157 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1998).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/1448

This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH, Department of
Hurrar. Services, ex rel. ,
STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA, ex rel.
RC3IN KIRBY,

}
)
)
)
)

Case No. 98G157-CA

Petitioners/Appellees, )
v.
Priority Mo. 15
ALEX JACCEY,

)

Respondent/Appellant. }

BRIEF CF PETITIONER/APPELLEE STATE OF UTAH
APPEAL FROM

HE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE COUNTY,
JUDGE WILLIAM BOHLING

A. ALEXANDER JACCBY, pro se
2317 Cakcrest Lane
Salt Lake City-,- Utah••&$&£&

UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
BRIEF
UTAH
DOCUMENT
KFU
50
nyi-ch.
•A10
DOCKET NO.

LYNN NICHOLAS #6006
Assistant Attorney General
JAN GRAHAM #12 31
Attorney General
Child & Family Support
Division
515 East 100 South, 6th Floor
P.O. Box 1980
Salt Lake City, UT 84110-1980
(801) 536-8348
Attorneys for Petitioners/
Appellees

ORAL ARGUMENT AND PUBLISHED OPINION REQUESTED

Uta

FILED
* Court of Appeafe

SfP

* 1 1998

•Ju'feD'AlesaodTO
C l e r k n# fK*% /%

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH
STATE
Human.
STATE
ROBIN

OF UTAH, Department of
Services, ex rel. ,
OF PENNSYLVANIA, ex rel.
KIRBY,

)
)
)
)
.)

Case No. 980157-CA

Petitioners/Appellees, )
)

v.

)
)

AVI ALEX JACOBY,

Priority No. 15

)
)

Respondent/Appellant. }

BRIEF OF PETITIONER/APPELLEE STATE OF UTAH
APPEAL FROM THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE COUNTY,
JUDGE WILLIAM BOHLING
A. ALEXANDER JACOBY, pro se
2317 Oakcrest Lane
Salt Lake City, Utah 84121
LYNN NICHOLAS #6008
Assistant Attorney General
JAN GRAHAM #1231
Attorney General
Child & Family Support
Division
515 East 100 South, 8th Floor
P.O. Box 1980
Salt Lake City, UT 84110-1980
(801) 536-8348
Attorneys for Petitioners/
Appellees
ORAL ARGUMENT AND PUBLISHED OPINION REQUESTED

TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page
iii

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

'. 1

CONTROLLING PROVISIONS

1

QUESTIONS PRESENTED/STANDARDS OF REVIEW

"1

STATEMENT OF THE CASE/STATEMENT OF FACTS

3

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

8

ARGUMENT
I.

10
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT
UIFSA, NOT URESA, IS THE CONTROLLING LAW
APPLICABLE TO THIS CASE
A.

B.

The Uniform Interstate Family Support
Act (UIFSA)Was the Controlling Law in
Utah for Interstate Enforcement Actions
When This Action was Filed; It Should Be
The Controlling Law for This Case
Even If the State Had Not Filed A Second
Order to Show Cause Under UIFSA, UIFSA
Should be Applied Retroactively.
The Trial Court Correctly Ruled That
It Had Both Personal Jurisdiction Over
Jacoby and Subject Matter Jurisdiction
Over the Case.
1.

2.

10

10

1 *>

16

The Trial Court Had Personal
Jurisdiction Over Jacoby Because
He Was Personally Served with Both
of the State's Orders to Show C a u s e Under URESA and Under UIFSA

16

The Trial Court Had Statutory Authority
Under UIFSA to Act in this Matter and
Thus Had Proper Subject Matter
Jurisdiction.

18

i

D.

II.
III.

CONCLUSION

To Effectuate the Remedial Purposes of the
Act, UIFSA Must Be Construed As the Controlling Law Applicable to This Case

20

THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT PENNSYLVANIA
LAW GOVERNS THE LIMITATIONS PERIOD UNDER UIFSA.
.

21

THE STATE OF UTAH LACKS JURISDICTION TO MODIFY
THE SPOUSAL SUPPORT AND VISITATION PROVISIONS OF
THE PARTIES' VIRGINIA DECREE

24

. .

25

ADENDA
Addendum A

Uniform Interstate Family Support Act

Addendum B

Judgment and Order dated February 6, 1996

Addendum C

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law dated
February 6, 1998

Addendum E

Child Support
Enforcement
Div. of Alaska
v.
Brenckle,
675 N.E.2d 390 (1997)(UIFSA applies
retroactively to all URESA proceedings,
whether pending or previously adjudicated
under URESA.)

ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES CITED

Barnes

v.

Barnes,

857 P.2d 257, 259 (Utah App. 1993)

Bingham v. Bingham,
1994)
Brenckle

v.

. . . 2, 1 £

872 P.2d 1065, 1067 (Utah App.
2

Brenckle,

424 Mass. 214, 675 N.E. 2d 390

(Mass. 1997)
Cowan v.

Moreno,

12
903 S.W.2d 119 (Texas App. 1995)

14

Cummings v. Cummings,
821 P.2d at 472, 476 (Utah App.
1991)
Deltoro
v. McMullen,
322 S.C. 328, 471 S.E.2d 742. (S.C. App.
1996)
Downey

State

Bank

v.

Major-Blaneney

Corp.,

Hagan,

In Interest
Maxwell

of

v.

13

547 p.2d 507, 510

(Utah 1976)
Hagan v.

17

16
17

810 P.2d 478, 481 (Utah App. 1991)
R.H.L.,

Maxwell,

942 P.2d 1386 (Colo. App. 1997)
754 P.2d 84, 86 (Utah Ct. App. 1988)

.

13, 16
. .

18
£- C

Morrisey
Morrisey

v.
v.

Morrisey,
Morrisey

679 A.2d 234 (Pa. Super. 1996)
....
{"Morrisey
II"),
A.2d
, 1998 . 22, 23

WL 315411 (Pa. 1998)
Pavlovich
Pilcher

v.
v.

Pavlovich,

State,

932 P.2d 1080 (Okla. 1997)

663 P.2d 450 (Utah 1983)

15

Roark v. Crabtree,
893 P.2d 1058, 1061-1062 (Utah (1995)
Schaumberg
v. Schaumberg,
875 P.d 598, 603 (Utah App.
1994)
Welsher
v.
1997)

Rager,

13

127 N . C . App. 5 2 1 , 491 S . E .

. .

15
17

2d 661
14

iii

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
42 Pa.CS.A § 5527

21, 23

Utah Code Ann. §§ 77-31-1 to 77-31-39 (1995)

3

Utah Code Ann. §§ 77-31-1 through 39 (1997 Supp.)

4

Utah Code Ann. § 77-31-7 (1990)

23

Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3{2) (h) (1996)

1

Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7.11 (Supp. 1998)
Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-45f-100 through 901 (Supp. 1998)

25
....

Utah Code Ann. § 78-45f-101 (7) (Supp. 1998)
Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-45f-102, -203 and -304 (Supp. 1998)

4
19

. .

18

Utah Code Ann. § 78-4 5f-206 (3) (Supp. 1998)

24

Utah Code Ann. § 78-45f-31i (Supp. 1998)

19

Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-45f-604(1) and -604(2)
(Supp. 1998)

1

Utah Code Ann. § 7 8 - 4 5 f - 6 0 4 (2)

21

Utah Code Ann. § 7 8 - 4 5 f - 9 0 1

20

(Supp. 1998)

iv

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH
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Human
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ROBIN
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OF PENNSYLVANIA, ex rel.
KIRBY,
Case No. 980157-CA
Petitioners/Appellees,

v.
Priority No.
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AVI ALEX JACOBY,
Respondent/Appellant.

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 (2) (h) (1996) .
Defendant seeks review of the Judgment and Order of the Third
Judicial District Court entered February 6, 1998.
Defendant filed a notice of appeal on March 5, 1998.
CONTROLLING PROVISIONS
The

following

statutory

provisions

are

relevant

to

the

determination of this case: Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-45f-604 (1)
and -604(2)

(Supp. 1998).

The full text of the statute is set

forth in Addendum A to this brief.
QUESTIONS PRESENTED/STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1.

Did the trial court correctly rule that the Uniform Interstate
Family

Support Act

controlled

this

case, rather

than

the

Uniform

Reciprocal

Enforcement

of

Support

Act, which

was

repealed by the Utah legislature effective July 1, 199"/?
Standard of Review: This issue involves a question of
law.

Conclusions of law are reviewed for correctness and

are given no special deference on appeal.
Bingham,

Bingnam

v.

872 P.2d 1065, 1067 (Utah App. 1994).

Did the trial court correctly rule that Jacoby was personally served with the State's order to show cause under UIFSA?
Standard of Review: This issue presents a question of
fact.

Appellate courts give great deference to the trial

court's findings of fact in divorce cases and ao nc:
overturn them unless they are clearly erroneous.
v. Barnes,

Barnes

857 P.2d 257, 259 (Utah App. 1993).

Did the trial court correctly rule that it had both subjectmatter jurisdiction of the case and personal jurisdiction over
Jacoby?.
Standard of Review: This issue presents a conclusion of
law.

The standard of review is correction of error with

no deference given.

Bingham,

872 P.2d at 1067.

Did the trial court correctly rule that Pennsylvania law,
which has no statute of limitations applicable to enforcement
of child support, applies to this case, rather than the Utah
eight-year statute of limitation?

2

Standard of Review: This issue presents a conclusion cf
law, which is reviewed for correctness with no deference
Bingham,

given.

Id.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE/STATEMENT OF FACTS
The

State

of

Utah,

Pennsylvania, initiated

at

the

request

of

the

State

of

an action to enforce the child support

provisions of the parties' Virginia divorce decree.

The action

was

Reciprocal

initiated

on

May

12,

Enforcement cf Support Act
77-31-39
cause,

1997, under

the

Uniform

("URESA"), Utah Code Ann. §§ 77-31-1 :o

(1995), with the filing of a motion and order to show

accompanied

by

an affidavit

attesting

to the

arrearage

calculation and a transmittal packet1 prepared by the State of
Pennsylvania (the "URESA order to show cause").
1

Robin Elizabeth

Kirby

v. Avi Alexander

(R- at 1-58, 371).

Jacoby,

Chancery

No. 3706-85, Circuit Court of the County of Chesterfield.
(R. at
41-58). The parties were married in Pennsylvania in 1980. (R.
at 41). At the time petitioner Robin Kirby filed a complaint for
divorce, both parties were living in Virginia and the complaint
was filed in Virginia.
(R. at 42). In light of Robin Kirby's
subsequent return to Pennsylvania, at the time of entry of the
final decree on July 24, 1987, the Virginia court transferred
jurisdiction of matters of child support and custody to the Court
of Common Pleas of Montgomery County, Pennsylvania.
(R. at 44).
Pennsylvania took jurisdiction of the matters of child support
and custody, substantial litigation ensued in that state and
Jacoby was ultimately incarcerated there for failure to pay child
support. (Tr. at 21). Jacoby subsequently moved to Utah. (Tr.
at 10). Pennsylvania then requested the State of Utah to
initiate this action. (R. at 23-24) .
2

The transmittal packet consisted of: the child support
enforcement transmittal; the petition; the affidavit of Robin
Kirby; and a certified copy of the Virginia final decree of
divorce, the related stipulation between the parties, and an
accompanying order.

3

Respondent/Appellant Avi Alex Jacoby was personally served with the
URESA order to show cause on May 20, 1997. (R. at 22, 371).
Effective April 29, 1996, the Utah legislature enacted the
Uniform Interstate Family Support Act ("UIFSA") which was intended
to ultimately supplant URESA.
901 (Supp. 1998).

Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-45f-100 through

At the time the URESA order to show cause was

filed, both URESA and UIFSA were in effect in Utah.
1, 1997, the Utah legislature repealed URESA.

Effective July

Utah Code Ann. §§

77-31-1 through 39 (1997 Supp.).
On October 8, 1997, Utah filed a motion and order to show
cause under UIFSA seeking enforcement of the Virginia decree and
substantially the same relief

(the "UIFSA order to show cause"),

except that the second order to show cause sought the additional
remedies

of

suspension

contempt

of Jacoby's

for

failure

Pennsylvania

by

the

pay

child

driver's, professional

licenses. (R. at 66-128, 371).
accompanied

to

same

and

support

and

recreational

The UFISA order to show cause was

transmittal

packet

from

the

State of

as was filed with the URESA order to show cause.

Jacoby was personally served with the UIFSA order to show cause on
October 22, 1997.

(R. at 129, 372).

The URESA order to show cause sought a judgment against Jacoby
in the amount of $59,287.00 representing accrued child support
arrears for the period December 1985 through April 1997. (R. at 2 ) .
The UIFSA order to show cause sought a judgment against Jacoby in

4

the amount of $54,287.05, representing child support due and owing
for the period December 1985 through June 1997.

(R. at 111).

Both orders to show cause were accompanied by affidavits of the
agent

of

the

computations

Office

of

substantiating

Recovery
the

Services

arrearage

who

compiled

amounts." Both

the
were

accompanied by the same URESA transmittal packet prepared by the
State of Pennsylvania. (R. at 6-18; 113-124).
A hearing on the URESA order to show cause was held on June
25, 1997, before Commissioner Lisa A. Jones.

The State sought a

judgment in the amount of $59,287 against Jacoby for child support
arrears for the period of December 1985 through April 1997 in light
of the fact that Pennsylvania has no statute of limitations for the
collection of child support.
the Utah eight-year

Jacoby raised the issue as to whether

statute of limitations should apply to the

arrearage calculation, which would significantly lower the judgment
amount.

The commissioner recommended that the legal issue of the

statute of limitations, as well as the amounts due and owing for
child support prior to the eight-year period and after the eightyear period, be certified for evidentiary hearing.
hearing at 4-6).

(Tr. of 6/25/97

An evidentiary hearing was held on October 8,

3

The arrearage amounts in the two computations are
different in that the later computation reflects payments and
credits during the period April through June 1997.

5

1997,

on the above-noted issues.

Jacoby did not appear and his

default was entered. (Tr. at 5 ) .
Jacoby then arrived twenty-five minutes late for the hearing.
Counsel for the State agreed to set aside the default and the court
proceeded with the hearing.

(Tr. at 7 ) . Jacoby again raised the

issue of the applicable statute of limitations.

The court heard

the

State.

arguments

of

Jacoby

and

counsel

for

the

testified and was cross-examined by counsel for the State.
8-22).

Jacoby
(Tr. at

At the conclusion of testimony and argument, the court

requested Jacoby and counsel for the State to brief the issues.
(Tr. at 26). The hearing was continued to December 8, 1997.

(Tr.

at 32) .
At the December 8th hearing, the court heard the arguments cf
Jacoby and counsel for the State.

(Tr. at 34-42).

Because the

court had not had an opportunity to review the briefs, the court
took the matter under advisement.

(Tr. at 43).

The court noteo

that it would review the briefs and rule based upon the hearing and
the briefs.

(Tr. at 43). In addition, the court allowed the State

and Jacoby to submit supplemental briefs. (Tr. at 47). The court
asked the parties to submit proposed findings and orders.
47).

The

court

noted

that

if

4

it

felt

further

(Tr. at

argument

was

All citations to the transcript are to the transcript of
the October 8, 1997, and December 8, 1997, hearings unless
otherwise noted.

6

necessary, another hearing would be scheduled, or the court would
rule on the papers as submitted.

(Tr. at 48).

Prior to the December 8, 1997, hearing, on December 1, 1997,
Jacoby filed a motion for summary judgment, as well as a motion for
judicial determination of applicable law, seeking a ruling:

(1)

that the Utah eight-year statute of limitations applied to these
proceedings; (2) that petitioner Robin Kirby was not entitled to
spousal support during periods when she cohabited with a person of
the

opposite

sex; and

(3) that

Jacoby

was

entitled

to a 50%

reduction in his child support obligation for time periods when the
children visited with him for at least 25 of any 30 consecutive
days by order of the court or written agreement of the parties.
(R. at 136-138, 240-242).

Jacoby put the issues of cohabitation

and extended visitation before the court for the first time in this
motion for summary judgment.

At the hearing on December 8, 1997,

he argued these issues before the court. (Tr. at 38-39).

The issue

of spousal support, however, was not before the court in that the
State was seeking a judgment only for child support arrears.
On February 4, 1998, the court made its minute entry and filed
findings
found,

of fact, conclusions

in

pertinent

part,

of law, judgment

that:

(1)

Jacoby's

and order, and
ongoing

spousal

support obligation terminated in September 1989, when petitioner
Robin Kirby remarried;

(2) Jacoby was personally served with the

State's URESA order to show cause on May 20, 1997; (3) Jacoby was

7

personally served with the State's UIFSA order to show cause on
October 22, 1997;

(4) the court had personal jurisdiction over

Jacoby, as well as subject matter jurisdiction; (5) UIFSA is the
controlling law of the case; (6) Pennsylvania law, which contains
no statute of limitation for the recovery of child support, applies
to the case and is determinative of the support arrears owed by
Jacoby.

(R. at 366-373).

The court entered

judgment

Jacoby in the amount of $55,887.05, representing

against

child

support

arrears for the period from December 1985 through November 1997.
(R. at 375-376).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The trial court correctly ruled that the Uniform Interstate
Family

Support

Act

("UIFSA")

controls

this

action

for

the

enforcement of Jacoby's child support obligation. UIFSA

and

its

predecessor statute, the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support
Act ("URESA"), were both in effect when the State of Utah filed the
action to enforce the parties' Virginia divorce decree in 199"7;
however, URESA was subsequently

repealed

and UIFSA is now the

controlling law in interstate child support collection cases in
Utah.

While the action was initially filed under URESA, Jacoby was

subsequently served with an order to show cause under UIFSA.
should, therefore, be the controlling law of the case.

UIFSA

Even if a

second order to show cause under UIFSA had not been filed and

8

served, UIFSA is a procedural, not a substantive, change to the law
and, therefore, may be applied retroactively.
The trial court had the requisite subject-matter jurisdiction
and personal jurisdiction over Jacoby for purposes of UIFSA.

The

court already had subject-matter jurisdiction as a result of the
State's

initiation

of

an action

under

URESA,

and

the

State's

subsequent filing under UIFSA substantially conformed with federal
requirements under UIFSA.

Furthermore,

the trial court found that

Jacoby was properly served with notice of the UIFSA filing, and the
return of service supports this factual determination.
The trial court also correctly ruled that Pennsylvania has no
statute of limitations pertaining to the collection of support
arrearages

and,

since

the

Pennsylvania

limitations

period

is

therefore longer than Utah's eight-year statute of limitations,
Pennsylvania law applies to this case under UIFSA.
Finally, the court lacked statutory authority to modify the
spousal support and visitation provisions of the parties' Virginia
decree.

Utah must give full faith and credit to the provisions of

the Virginia decree regarding spousal support and visitation and
cannot interpret those provisions in light of Utah law.

9

ARGUMENT
I
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT UIFSA, NOT
URESA, IS THE CONTROLLING LAW APPLICABLE TO THIS CASE.
The

trial

controlling

court

concluded

that

UIFSA,

law applicable to the case.

not

URESA,

is the

(R. at 372).

Jacoby

argues that URESA, not UIFSA, applies to this case because: (1) the
case was initially

filed under URESA;

(2) he was not properly

served with the UIFSA order to show cause, thus, the court lacked
personal jurisdiction over him; (3) the UIFSA forms filed by the
Stats and served on Jacoby were "fatally defective," and thus the
trial court did not have subject matter jurisdiction; (4) application

cf UIFSA affects his substantive

cannot be applied retroactively.

rights, thus, the Act

Jacoby's arguments are without

merit.
A.

The

The Uniform Interstate Family Support Act
(UIFSA) Was The Controlling Law in Utah
for Interstate Enforcement Actions When
This Action Was Filed; It Should be the
Controlling Law for This Case.

Uniform

Interstate

Family

Support

Act

(UIFSA)

is a

comprehensive uniform act focusing on the interstate establishment,
modification, and enforcement of child support obligations.

5

It

As child support obligors became increasingly mobile, the
difficulties associated with the enforcement of child support
obligations also increased. As a result, in 1950, the National
Conference of Commissioners of Uniform Laws promulgated a model
act which later was enacted in every state as URESA. URESA was

10

has now been enacted into law by all fifty states.
UIFSA and it became effective on April 29, 1996.
URESA

was

also

available

for

enforcement

Utah enacted
At that time,

purposes.

legislature repealed URESA effective July 1, 1997.

The

Utah

Since that

date, UIFSA is the controlling law in Utah for the enforcement of
support orders in an interstate case.
The

State

initially

filed

this

action

under

URESA,

but

subsequently filed and served an order to show cause under UIFSA,
seeking the additional

remedies of contempt for failure to pay

child support, and suspension of Jacoby's driver's, professional,
and recreational licenses.

(R. at 128). UIFSA was the controlling

law in the State of Utah when the second order to show cause was

the first act that specifically addressed the issue of interstate
enforcement of support orders. The Act made enforcement remedies
available to all because it allowed enforcement without requiring
the obligee parent to travel long distances for an enforcement
action.
Although URESA was helpful in facilitating interstate
establishment and enforcement of support orders, it also resulted
in problems, such as the creation of multiple child support
orders in individual cases with support obligations in differing
amounts. Thus, the Conference of Commissioners of Uniform Laws
decided to replace URESA with a new model act, the Uniform
Interstate Family Support Act (UIFSA). Many of UIFSA's
provisions represent new solutions to problems inherent in
interstate establishment and enforcement of child support
obligations under URESA. For example, UIFSA creates a structure
designed to provide for only one support order at a time and in
cases where there are multiple support orders, UIFSA provides
rules for determination of the controlling order.

11

filed;

UIFSA should be the controlling law applicable to this

case.
B.

Even If The State Had Not Filed A Second Order
to Show Cause Under UIFSA, UIFSA Should Be
Applied Retroactively.

Jacoby argues that because this action was initiated under
URESA, URESA is the controlling
retroactive application.

law and UIFSA cannot be given

While other states have addressed the

issue of the retroactive application of UIFSA, this is a case of
first

impression

in

the

Stare

Massachusetts, North Carolina
application to UIFSA.

of

Utah.

Courts

in

and Texas have given

In Brenckle

v. Brenckle,

Colorado,

retroactive

424 Mass. 214, 675

N.E. 2d 390 (Mass. 1997), the court noted that this "case raises
questions about the relationship between successive Massachusetts
statutes for the interstate enforcement of child support orders."
675 N.E. at 391.

In Brenckle,

the obligor challenged a judgment

for child support arrears entered by an Alaska court and enforced
by a Massachusetts court.
Alaska

under URESA,

Id.

seeking

The obligee commenced the action in
to enforce the Alaska

Massachusetts where the obligor resided.

Id.

judgment in

at 391-392.

On

February 10, 1995, the Massachusetts court found the obligor to be
liable in the amount of $107,365, the amount of the Alaska judgment
with

interest.

Id.

at

392.

Effective

that

same

date,

Massachusetts URESA statute was repealed and UIFSA enacted.

12

the
Id.

Subsequently, the obligor appealed the lower court judgment.
Thus, the Massachusetts appeals court confronted which law applied
to the appeai--URESA, under which the action was commenced, or
UIFSA,

now

determined

in

effect

that

UIFSA

in

Massachusetts.

should

be

applied

The

appeals

court

retroactively.

The

Massachusetts UIFSA statute specifically provides that "any URESA
action that is Spending or was previously adjudicated . . . may be
transferred to the probate and family court department . . . and
[ujpon transfer' the provisions of UIFSA shall apply."

Id. at 393.

The Massachusetts appeals court noted, however, that the case had
not been

transferred

to the

family

court, but

found

that

the

legislature intended retroactive application of the statute, and
relied on general principles of statutory construction, noting that
UIFSA is a remedial statute not affecting substantive rights and,
thus, should be applied retroactively.
Pavlovich,

Id.

But

see

Pavlovich

v.

932 P.2d 1080 (Okla. 1997), wher e the court declined to

give retroactive application to UIFSA.'
A Colorado court in In

Interest

of

R.H.L.,

942 P.2d

(Colo. App. 1997), relied on reasoning similar to the

1386

Brenckle

court in reaching the conclusion that the Colorado UIFSA statute
should be applied retroactively:
6

Pavlovich
involved the modification of a child support
order in which the court would have lost jurisdiction under
UIFSA's concept of continuing, exclusive jurisdiction. 932 P.2d
at 1086, n, 9. See also Deltoro
v. McMullen,
322 S.C. 328, 471
S.E.2d 742. (S.C. App. 1996).
13

The replacement of URESA and RURESA [Revised URESA]
by UIFSA did nor expand the permissible scope of
issues to be addressed in interstate child support
enforcement proceedings. To the contrary, the goal
of the new law was to provide mechanisms to address
problems, such as multiple or conflicting support
orders as to the same parties and children, that
had persisted in the interstate enforcement of
support under RURESA.
Id.

at 1388.

In Cowan v.

Moreno,

903 S.W.2d 119.

(Texas App.

1995), a Texas court held that UIFSA rather than revised URESA
governed the procedure for the registration of a foreign child
support decree issued prior to UIFSA's effective date and filed in
Texas after the effective date, as the foreign decree was entered
when the responding state rendered judgment, rather than when the
foreign court rendered the decree.

903 S.W.2d at 122.

The court

applied UIFSA even though tne initiating state used URESA forms.
Finally, the Court of Appeals of North Carolina in Welsher
Rager,

v.

127 N.C. App. 521, 491 S.E. 2d 661 (1997), held that UIFSA

governs all proceedings over any foreign support order which is
registered in North Carolina after the effective date of UIFSA.
491 S.E.2d at 664.
the

courts

from

The court explained, "our interpretation saves
the

arduous

task

of

attempting

to

determine

arrearage based on the application of two different sets of law to
the same order."

Id.

at 665.

While Utah courts have not yet specifically addressed the
question of the retroactive application of UIFSA, the issue has
been addressed with respect to other statutes.

14

The general rule in

Utah is that "a legislative enactment which alters the substantive
law

cr

affects

vested

rights

will

not

be

read

to

operate

retrospectively unless the legislature has clearly expressed that
intention."
(1995).

Roark

v.

Crabtree,

893 P.2d 1058, 1061-1062

{Utah

However, where a statute is procedural only, and does not

affect substantive rights, the courts have recognized an exception
In Pilcher

to the general rule.

v. State,

663 P.2d

450

(Utah

1983), the Utah Supreme Court noted: "A contrary rule applies where
a statute changes only procedural law by providing a different: mode
or

form

of procedure

for

enforcing

substantive

rights.

Such

remedial statutes are generally applied retrospectively to accrued
or pending actions to further the Legislature's remedial purpose."
Id.

at 455.
Such is the case here.

URESA was created to seek enforcement

of foreign support orders as obligors moved from state to state.
UIFSA was created to streamline that same process. "UIFSA did not
expand

the

permissible

scope

of

issues

to

be

addressed

in

interstate child support enforcement proceedings," as the Colorado

7

Jacoby appears to argue that by giving retroactive
application to UIFSA and applying Pennsylvania law, which has no
statute of limitations for child support collections, rather than
Utah's eight-year statute, his substantive rights are affected.
(Appellant's brief at 32). Petitioner Robin Kirby's rights had
already accrued under Pennsylvania and Virginia law when the
Virginia divorce decree was registered in 1987. Kirby now merely
seeks to enforce her substantive rights. Jacoby's substantive
rights are not affected under UIFSA any more than they are under
URESA: an order had already been entered against him.

15

Court of Appeals recognized in In Interest
1388.

of R.H.L.,

942 P.22 at

Thus, the retroactive application of UIFSA in this case is

entirely appropriate, and in accord with established principles of
staiurory construction.
C.

Jacoby

The Trial Court Correctly Ruled That It Had
Both Personal Jurisdiction Over Jacoby and
Subject Matter Jurisdiction Over the Case.
argues that he was not personally

served with the

State's UIFSA order to show cause and thus maintains that the trial
court had neither personal jurisdiction over him nor subject matter
jurisdiction under UIFSA.
1.

Jacoby's reasoning is flawed.

The Trial Court Had Personal Jurisdiction
Over Jacoby Because He Was Personally
Served with Both of the State's Orders to
Show Cause—Under URESA and Under UIFSA.

The trial court found that Jacoby was personally served with
both of the State's orders to show cause, under URESA and under
UIFSA.

(R. at 372).

The returns of service support the court's

findings (R. at 22, 129). Appellate courts give great deference to
the trial court's findings of fact in divorce cases and do not
overturn them unless they are clearly erroneous.
877 P.2d 257, 259

(Utah App. 1993).

Barnes

v.

Barnes,

A finding of fact will be

adjudged clearly erroneous only if it violates the standards set by
the appellate court, is against the clear weight of the evidence,
or the reviewing court is "left with a definite and firm conviction
that a mistake has been committed" even
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though there is evidence

to support the finding.
(Utah App. 1991).

Cummings

v.

Cummings,

821 P. 2d at 472, 476

A party seeking to overturn the trial court's

factual findings has the burden of marshaling the evidence which
supports the findings and then demonstrating that, despite such
evidence, the findings are nevertheless so lacking in support as to
be against the clear weight of the evidence.

Hagan v.

Hagan,

81G

P.2d 478, 481 (Utah App. 1991).
Jacoby has not marshaled any evidence.

He has merely reargued

his position, asserting again on appeal that he was not served with
the State's UIFSA order to show cause, a contention

obviously

contrary to the evidence and to the trial court's finding of fact.
In Schaumberg

v.

Schaumberg,

875 P.d 598, 603

(Utah App. 1994),

this Court held that a husband who had merely reargued evidence
supporting his position had not marshaled evidence.
failed to meet his marshaling requirement.

Jacoby has

Thus, the findings of

Jacoby claims that service of the UIFSA order to show
cause was defective, in part, because the address on the upper
right-hand corner inserted by the constable along with his
signature and the date and time of service is Jacoby's office
address, whereas the return of service shows his home address
(Appellant's brief at 36). Rule 4 of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure requires the person making service to endorse upon the
copy the time and date of service and sign the copy. The address
on the copy is not of any consequence. The return of service is
the constable's affidavit testifying to the date and place of
service. Since there is no dispute that both addresses are
Jacoby's, it is unclear why this discrepancy would make service
defective.
In addition, Jacoby argues that service of process on
October 22, 1997, for a hearing scheduled for October 29, 1997,
"falls woefully short on letter and meaning of due notice
provision of the United States and Utah Constitutions."
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the trial court that Jacoby was personally served with both of the
State's orders to show cause—under URESA and under UIFSA—must be
upheld.
In any event, whether or not personal service under UIFSA was
defective, Jacoby made a general appearance before the court on
December 8, 1998.
the

purpose

of

He claims he made only a limited appearance for
objecting

to

the

trial

court's

jurisdiction.

However, the transcript of the record reveals that he argued every
substantive issue that was before the court. (Tr. at 36-40; 44-47).
His appearance was thus a general

appearance

and he

himself to the jurisdiction of the court. Downey
Major-Blaneney
Maxwell,

Corp.,

547 P.2d 507, 510

State

submitted
Bank

(Utah 1976;; Maxwell

v.
v.

754 P.2d 84, 86 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).
2.

The Trial Court Had Statutory Authority
to Act in this Matter and Thus Had Proper
Subject Matter Jurisdiction.

The trial court found that it had subject matter jurisdiction
in

this

case.

(R. at

372).

conferred by Utah Code Ann.

Subject

matter

jurisdiction

is

§§ 78-45f-102, -203 and -304 (Supp.

1998).
Jacoby

argues

that

the trial

court

lacked

subject matter

jurisdiction under UIFSA because the papers that were served on him

(Appellant's brief at 37). Rule 6 of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure provides notice of hearings on motions shall be served
at least five days before the scheduled hearing. The State met
the requirements of Rule 6.
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under UIFSA were "fatally defective."

He claims that the State's

UIFSA order to show cause was defective because it was accompanied
by

the

same

transmittal

packet

prepared

by

the

State

of

Pennsylvania as accompanied the URESA order to show cause.

It is

not material that the transmittal forms were URESA forms.

Utah

Code Ann. § 78-45f-101 (7) (Supp. 1998).

All that is required under

UIFSA is that: "The petition must specify the relief sought.

The

petition and the accompanying documents must conform substantially
with the requirements imposed by the forms mandated by federal law
for use in cases filed by a support enforcement agency."
Ann. § 78-45f-311

(Supp. 1998).

Utah Code

The State's UIFSA order to show

cause and the accompanying documents substantially complied with
UIFSA requirements.
Jacoby was properly served and received notice of the action
against him under both URESA and UIFSA, and the trial court so
found.

Jacoby has not met his marshaling burden.

The clear weight

of the evidence supports the trial court's findings, which must be
upheld.

The court had both personal jurisdiction over Jacoby and

subject matter jurisdiction of the case.

9

Jacoby further argues that the trial court did not yet
have subject matter jurisdiction under UIFSA at the December 8,
1997, hearing because the December 8th hearing was a continuance
of the October 8, 1997, hearing and the State did not file its
UIFSA order to show cause until October 8, 1997. This argument
is patently frivolous.
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D.

To Effectuate the Remedial Purposes of the Act,
UIFSA Must be Construed As the Controlling Law
Applicable to this Case.

In order to effectuate the remedial purposes of the Act, it is
imperative that Utah courts apply UIFSA to all cases pending or
initiated

under URESA.

The purpose

of the Act

is to achieve

uniformity among txhe various states in the enforcement of child and
spousal

support

legislature

does

orders.
not

While

UIFSA

specifically

as enacted

provide

for

by

the

the

Utah

retroactive

application of UIFSA to cases filed under URESA, a provision of the
statute implies that is what the legislature intended:
This chapter shall be applied and construed to
effectuate its general purpose to make uniform the law
with respect to the subject of this chapter among the
states enacting it.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-45f-90i

(Supp. 1998). This language strongly

suggests that it was the intent of the legislature in enacting
UIFSA and repealing URESA that UIFSA apply to ail cases filed or
pending

under URESA.

To apply

URESA after

its repeal

to the

substantial number of cases that were initiated under URESA would
be in derogation of the purposes of UIFSA--to make uniform the law
with respect to child support enforcement.
remedial

purposes

Thus, to effectuate the

of the Act, UIFSA must be construed

as the

controlling law in this case, and in all other cases now pending in
Utah courts that were initiated under URESA.
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II
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT PENNSYLVANIA
GOVERNS THE LIMITATIONS PERIOD UNDER UIFSA.

LAW

The trial court correctly ruled that Pennsylvania law governs
the limitations period under UIFSA.

Pennsylvania has no statute of

limitations

support

applicable

specially provides that

to

child

NN

arrearages.

[i]n a proceeding

UIFSA

for arrearages, the

statute of limitations under the laws of this state or of the
issuing state, v/hichever
§ 78-45f-604(2)

is

longer,

applies."

(emphasis added).

Utah Code Ann.

Because Pennsylvania

has no

limitations period applicable to child support collections and Utah
has an eight-year statute of limitations, Pennsylvania law provides
the longer limitations period, and, thus, under UIFSA, Pennsylvania
law

should

apply.

The

trial

court

so

found:

"the

State

of

Pennsylvania has no statute of limitations for the recovery of
child support and . . . this fact is determinative of the support
arrears owed by the Defendant."

(R. at 372.)

Jacoby argues that Utah's eight-year statute of limitations is
applicable
support

to this action

arrears.

His

for the collection

reasoning

is

flawed.

of accrued
He

child

attempts

to

demonstrate that Pennsylvania's "catch-all", six-year statute of
limitations, 42 Pa.C.S.A § 5527, should be considered controlling
in that jurisdiction.

Under Jacoby's reasoning, Utah's eight-year

10

The result would have been the same if the court had
applied Virginia law.
21

statute of limitations would apply under UIFSA as it would be the
longer of the two statutes.
Jacoby misguidedly relies on a decision of the Pennsylvania
Superior Court in Morrisey
199c),

in which

v. Morrisey,

the court

found

679 A.2d 234 (Pa. Super.

that

a four-year

statute of

limitations prevented the registration in Pennsylvania of a Texas
child support order. That decision was reversed in Morrisey
Morrisey ("Morrisey II") ,
which

the Pennsylvania

statute

applicable

A.2d
Supreme

, 1998 WL 315411 (Pa. 1998), in
Court: held

to actions

v.

upon

that

the four-year

judgments

did not bar

registration and enforcement of the Texas child support order.
Mrs.

Morrisey

had registered

her Texas

support

order in

Pennsylvania under RURESA

(revised URESA) and sought to collect

approximately

in arrearages.

$22,000.00

The Superior

Court

concluded that Mrs. Morrisey was entitled only to arrearages that
had accrued since April 1991, four years prior to the date that
registration had occurred.

In reversing the Superior Court, the

Pennsylvania Supreme Court reasoned that RURESA's express purpose
of

improving

and extending

enforcement

of duties

Pennsylvania

courts

of

RURESA, a properly

support

to afford

effect as domestic orders.

by

legislation

was served

foreign

Id.

registered

reciprocal

support

the

by

requiring

orders

the same

The court stated, "Thus, under
foreign support order:

^shall be

treated in the same manner as a support order issued by a court of

22

Id.

this Commonwealth.'"

at 2.

The court concluded that "the

four-year statute applicable to actions upon judgments does not bar
registration and enforcement of the Texas support order pursuant to
RURESA.

This interpretation comports with the legislature's intent

to maintain substantially equal access and the means to enforce
support obligations as between children residing in Pennsylvania
and children residing in other states."

Id.

Jacoby attempts to use the Pennsylvania six-year statute as a
shield against satisfying an ongoing obligation of eleven years,
despite the fact that the provision applies to the commencement
civil actions.

See

42 Pa.C.S.A § 5527.

of

To allow the statute to

provide Jacoby a shield from his ongoing, court-ordered obligation
would be contrary to the ruling of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court

in Morrisey
For

II.
the

above

reasons,

this

Court

should

affirm

the

determination of the trial court that Pennsylvania has no statute
of limitations applicable to child support collections and, thus,
under UIFSA, Pennsylvania law applies rather than Utah's eight-year
statute of limitations.
11

Jacoby appears to argue that under either URESA or UIFSA,
Utah law should control since he has resided in the State of Utah
during most of the period in question.
(Appellant's brief at
38). Jacoby's argument is without merit. If this Court determines that URESA is the controlling law applicable to this case,
then Utah law with its eight-year statute of limitations will
apply. Utah Code Ann. § 77-31-7 (1990). If this Court determines
that UIFSA is the controlling law, then Pennsylvania law, which
contains no statute of limitations for the collection of child

23

III.
THE STATE OF UTAH LACKS JURISDICTION TO MODIFY SPOUSAL SUPPORT
AND VISITATION PROVISIONS OF THE PARTIES' VIRGINIA DECREE.
The parties' Virginia divorce decree specifically provides for
the conditions upon which spousal support shall terminate: "the
husband's death, the wife's death, her remarriage, her graduation
from medical school or June 30, 1992, whichever occurs first."

(R.

at 49).

The

The decree also provides for visitation rights.

decree does not mention cohabitation as a condition for termination
cf spousal support.

Nor does the decree provide for a reduction in

child support during periods of extended visitation.
Utah law provides for termination of spousal support upon
cohabitation and a fifty-percent reduction in child support for
periods when a child lived with the noncustodial parent for 25 out
of 30 consecutive days.

Jacoby seeks a ruling from this Court

reading those provisions into his Virginia divorce decree.
The Virginia decree must be enforced by its terms, and not in
light of Utah law.

Under UIFSA, Utah courts lack "continuing,

exclusive jurisdiction" over spousal support orders and may not
modify such orders.

Utah Code Ann. § 78-45f-206 (3) (Supp. 1998).

Thus, Utah lacks jurisdiction over Jacoby's spousal support order
and cannot modify it or interpret it in light of Utah law.
modifications must be sought from the Virginia courts.

support, will apply.
24

Those

Finally, a judgment for spousal support arrears was not sought
in this action and thus the issue of the amount of spousal support
arrears is not before this court.

With respect to visitation, even

if Utah's provision for a 50% reduction in child support during the
periods of extended visitation were applicable to Jacoby's decree,
Utah law requires either a court order for extended periods of
visitation or a written agreement between the parties.
Ann. § 78-45-7.11 (Supp. 1998).

Utah Code

Jacoby has neither.

Utah courts cannot reopen and relitigate the merits of the
spousal support award and the visitation provisions of the existing
order.

This is exclusively an enforcement proceeding.

give full faith and credit to the Virginia decree.

Utah must

Jacoby's only

purpose in asking the Court to retroactively apply Utah law is to
obtain credits against his support which are specifically excluded
in the divorce decree.

This the Court cannot do.

Thus, Jacoby's

request for such a ruling from this Court must be denied.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the State of Utah urges this Court
to affirm the judgment and order of the trial court, including the
judgment against Jacoby and in favor of petitioner Robin Kirby, and
the finding that UIFSA is the controlling law applicable to this
case.
Because Utah courts have not yet addressed the question of the
application of UIFSA to cases initiated or pending under URESA, the
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State requests oral argument and believes a published opinion is
warranted.

.
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modification.
Effect of registration for modification.
Modification of child support order of another state.
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PARTI
GENERAL PROVISIONS
8-45M00.

Title.

This chapter is known as the "Uniform Interstate Family Support Act."
History: C. 1953, 77-3la-100, enacted by
1996, ch. 149, § 2; renumbered by L.
1997, ch. 232, § 83.
Amendment Notes. — The 1997 amendment, effective July 1, 1997, renumbered this

78-45M01.

section, which formerly appeared as § 77-3 la100.
Effective Dates. —- Laws 1996, ch. 149
became effective on April 29,1996, pursuant to
Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25.

Definitions.

In this chapter:
(1) "Child" means an individual, whether over or under the age of
majority, who is or is alleged to be owed a duty of support by the
individual's parent or who is or is alleged to be the beneficiary of a support
order directed to the parent.
(2) "Child support order" means a support order for a child, including a
child who has attained the age of majority under the law of the issuing
state.
(3) "Duty of support" means an obligation imposed or imposable by law
to provide support for a child, spouse, or former spouse, including an
unsatisfied obligation to provide support.
(4) "Home state" means the state in which a child lived with a parent or
a person acting as parent for at least six consecutive months immediately
preceding the time of filing of a petition or comparable pleading for
support and, if a child is less than six months old, the state in which the
child lived from birth with any of them. A period of temporary absence of
any of them is counted as part of the six-month or other period.
(5) "Income" includes earnings or other periodic entitlements to money
from any source and any other property subject to withholding for support
under the law of this state.
(6) "Income-withholding order" means an order or notice directed to an
obligor's employer directing the employer to withhold support from the
income of the obligor in accordance with Title 62A, Chapter 11, Part 4 or
Part 5.
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(7) "Initiating state" means a state from which a proceeding is forwarded or in which a proceeding is filed for forwarding to a responding
state under this chapter or a law or procedure substantially similar to this
chapter, the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act, or the
Revised Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act.
(8) "Initiating tribunal" means the authorized tribunal in an initiating
state.
(9) "Issuing state" means the state in which a tribunal issues a support
order or renders a judgment determining parentage.
(10) "Issuing tribunal" means the tribunal that issues a support order
or renders a judgment determining parentage.
(11) "Law" includes decisional and statutory law and rules and regulations having the force of law.
(12) "Obligee" means:
(a) an individual to whom a duty of support is or is alleged to be
owed or in whose favor a support order has been issued or a judgment
determining parentage has been rendered;
(b) a state or political subdivision to which the rights under a duty
of support or support order have been assigned or which has independent claims based on financial assistance provided to an individual
obligee; or
(c) an individual seeking a judgment determining parentage of the
individual's child.
(13) "Obligor" means an individual, or the estate of a decedent who:
(a) owes or is alleged to owe a duty of support;
(b) is alleged but has not been adjudicated to be a parent of a child;
or
(c) is liable under a support order.
(14) "Register" means to file a support order or judgment determining
parentage in the district court.
(15) "Registering tribunal" means a tribunal in which a support order is
registered.
(16) "Responding state" means a state m which a proceeding is filed or
to which a proceeding is forwarded for filing from an initiating state under
this chapter or a law or procedure substantially similar to this chapter, the
Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act, or the Revised Uniform
Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act.
(17) "Responding tribunal" means the authorized tribunal in a responding state.
(18) "Spousal-support order" means a support order for a spouse or
former spouse of the obligor.
(19) "State" means a state of the United States, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, the United States Virgin Islands, or any territory or
insular possession subject to the jurisdiction of the United States. The
term includes an Indian tribe and a foreign jurisdiction that has enacted
a law or established procedures for issuance and enforcement of support
orders which are substantially similar to the procedures under this
chapter.
(20) "Support enforcement agency" means a public official or agency
authorized to seek:
(a) enforcement of support orders or laws relating to the duty of
support;
(b) establishment or modification of child support;
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(c) determination of parentage; or
(d) to locate obligors or their assets.
(21) "Support order" means a judgment, decree, or order, whether
temporary, final, or subject to modification, for the benefit of a child, a
spouse, or a former spouse, which provides for monetary support, health
care, arrearages, or reimbursement, and may include related costs and
fees, interest, income withholding, attorney's fees, and other relief.
(22) "Tribunal" means a court, administrative agency, or quasi-judicial
entity authorized to establish, enforce, or modify support orders or to
determine parentage.
History: C. 1953, 77-31a-101, enacted by
L. 1996, ch. 149, § 3; renumbered by L.
1997, ch. 232, § 84.
Amendment Notes. — The 1997 amendment, effective July 1, 1997, renumbered this
section, which formerly appeared as § 77-3 la101; added "or Part 5" in Subsection (6); in
Subsection (7) added "or procedure" and added

"or the Revised Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act"; rewrote Subsection (16);
added "the United States Virgin Islands" and
"enacted a law or" in Subsection (19); and made
stylistic changes.
Effective Dates. — Laws 1996, ch. 149
became effective on April 29,1996, pursuant to
Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25.

78-45M02. Tribunal of state.
The district court and the Department of Human Services are the tribunals
of this state.
History: C. 1953, 77-31a-102, enacted by
L. 1996, ch. 149, § 4; renumbered by L.
1997, ch. 232, § 85.
Amendment Notes. — The 1997 amendment, effective July 1, 1997, renumbered this

section, which formerly appeared as § 77-3la102.
Effective Dates. — Laws 1996, ch. 149
became effective on April 29,1996, pursuant to
Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25.

78-45f-103. Remedies cumulative.
Remedies provided by this chapter are cumulative and do not affect the
availability of remedies under other law.
History: C. 1953, 77-31a-103, enacted by
L. 1996, ch. 149, § 5; renumbered by L.
1997, ch. 232, § 86.
Amendment Notes. — The 1997 amendment, effective July 1, 1997, renumbered this

section, which formerly appeared as § 77-3 la103.
Effective Dates. — Laws 1996, ch. 149
became effective on April 29,1996, pursuant to
Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25.

PART 2
JURISDICTION
78-45f-201. Bases for jurisdiction over nonresident.
In a proceeding to establish, enforce, or modify a support order or to
determine parentage, a tribunal of this state may exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident individual, or the individual's guardian or conservator,
if:
(1) the individual is personally served with notice within this state;
(2) the individual submits to the jurisdiction of this state by consent, by
entering a general appearance, or by filing a responsive document having
the effect of waiving any contest to personal jurisdiction;
(3) the individual resided with the child in this state;
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(4) the individual resided in this state and provided prenatal expenses
or support for the child;
(5) the child resides in this state as a result of the acts or directives of
the individual;
(6) the individual engaged in sexual intercourse in this state and the
child may have been conceived by that act of intercourse;
(7) the individual asserted parentage in the putative father registry
maintained in this state by the state registrar of vital records in the
Department of Health pursuant to Title 78, Chapter 30, Adoption; or
(8) there is any other basis consistent with the constitutions of this
state and the United States for the exercise of personal jurisdiction.
History: C 1953, 77-31a-201, enacted by
L. 1996, ch. 149, § 6; renumbered by L.
1997, ch. 232, § 87.
Amendment Notes. — The 1997 amendment, effective July 1, 1997, renumbered this

section, which formerly appeared as § 77-31a201.
Effective Dates. — Laws 1996, ch. 149
became effective on April 29,1996, pursuant to
Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25.

78-45f-202. Procedure when exercising jurisdiction over
nonresident.
A tribunal of this state exercising personal jurisdiction over a nonresident
under Section 78-45f-201 may apply Section 78-45f-316 to receive evidence
from another state, and Section 78-45-318 to obtain discovery through a
tribunal of another state. In all other respects, Parts 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7 do not
apply and the tribunal shall apply the procedural and substantive law of this
state, including the rules on choice of law other than those established by this
chapter.
History: C. 1953, 77-31a-202, enacted by
L. 1996, ch. 149, § 7; renumbered by L.
1997, ch. 232, § 88.
Amendment Notes. — The 1997 amendment, effective July 1, 1997, renumbered this
section, which formerly appeared as § 77-3la-

78-45f-203.

202, and changed the section references to
reflect the renumbering of this chapter.
Effective Dates. — Laws 1996, ch. 149
became effective on April 29, 1996, pursuant to
Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25.

Initiating and responding tribunal of state.

Under this chapter, a tribunal of this state may serve as an initiating
tribunal to forward proceedings to another state and as a responding tribunal
for proceedings initiated in another state.
History: C. 1953, 77-31a-203, enacted by
L. 1996, ch. 149, § 8; renumbered by L.
1997, ch. 232, § 89.
Amendment Notes. — The 1997 amendment, effective July 1, 1997, renumbered this

78-45f-204.

section, which formerly appeared as § 77-3la203.
Effective Dates. — Laws 1996, ch. 149
became effective on April 29,1996, pursuant to
Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25.

Simultaneous proceedings in another state.

(1) A tribunal of this state may exercise jurisdiction to' establish a support
order if the petition is filed after a petition or comparable pleading is filed in
another state only:
(a) if the petition in this state is filed before the expiration of the time
allowed in the other state for filing a responsive pleading challenging the
exercise of jurisdiction by* the other state;
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(b) if the contesting party timely challenges the exercise of jurisdiction
in the other state; and
(c) if relevant, this state is the home state of the child.
(2) A tribunal of this state may not exercise jurisdiction to establish a
support order if the petition is filed before a petition or comparable pleading is
filed in another state:
(a) if the petition or comparable pleading in the other state is filed
before the expiration of the time allowed in this state for filing a
responsive pleading challenging the exercise of jurisdiction by this state;
(b) if the contesting party timely challenges the exercise of jurisdiction
in this state; and
(c) if relevant, the other state is the home state of the child.
History: C. 1953, 77-31a-204, enacted by
L. 1996, ch. 149, § 10; renumbered by L.
1997, ch. 232, § 90.
Amendment Notes. — The 1997 amendment, effective July 1, 1997, renumbered this

78-45f-205.

section, which formerly appeared as § 77-31a204.
Effective Dates. — Laws 1996, ch. 149
became effective on April 29,1996, pursuant to
Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25.

Continuing, exclusive jurisdiction.

(1) A tribunal of this state issuing a support order consistent with the law of
this state has continuing, exclusive jurisdiction over a child support order:
(a) as long as this state remains the residence of the obligor, the
individual obligee, or the child for whose benefit the support order is
issued; or
(b) until all of the parties who are individuals have filed written
consents with the tribunal of this state for a tribunal of another state to
modify the order and assume continuing, exclusive jurisdiction.
(2) A tribunal of this state issuing a child support order consistent with the
law of this state may not exercise its continuing jurisdiction to modify the order
if the order has been modified by a tribunal of another state pursuant to a law
substantially similar to this chapter.
(3) If a child support order of this state is modified by a tribunal of another
state pursuant to a law substantially similar to this chapter, a tribunal of this
state loses its continuing, exclusive jurisdiction with regard to prospective
enforcement of the order issued in this state, and may only:
(a) enforce the order that was modified as to amounts accruing before
the modification;
(b) enforce nonmodifiable aspects of that order; and
(c) provide other appropriate relief for violations of that order which
occurred before the effective date of the modification.
(4) A tribunal of this state shall recognize the continuing, exclusive jurisdiction of a tribunal of another state which has issued a child support order
pursuant to a law substantially similar to this chapter.
(5) A temporary support order issued ex parte or pending resolution of a
jurisdictional conflict does not create continuing, exclusive jurisdiction in the
issuing tribunal.
(6) A tribunal of this state issuing a support order consistent with the law of
this state has continuing, exclusive jurisdiction over a spousal support order
throughout the existence of the support obligation. A tribunal of this state may
not modify a spousal support order issued by a tribunal of another state having
continuing, exclusive jurisdiction over that order under the law of that state.
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History: C. 1953, 77-31a-205, enacted by
L. 1996, ch. 149, § 11; renumbered by L.
1997, ch. 232, § 91.
Amendment Notes. — The 1997 amendment, effective July 1, 1997, renumbered this

78-45f-207

section, which formerly appeared as § 77-31a205, and made stylistic changes.
Effective Dates. — Laws 1996, ch. 149
became effective on April 29,1996, pursuant to
Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25.

78-45f-206. Enforcement and modification of support order by tribunal having continuing jurisdiction.
(1) A tribunal of this state may serve as an initiating tribunal to request a
tribunal of another state to enforce or modify a support order issued in that
state.
(2) A tribunal of this state having continuing, exclusive jurisdiction over a
support order may act as a responding tribunal to enforce or modify the order.
If a party subject to the continuing, exclusive jurisdiction of the tribunal no
longer resides in the issuing state, in subsequent proceedings the tribunal may
apply Section 78-45f-316 to receive evidence from another state and Section
78-45f-318 to obtain discovery through a tribunal of another state.
(3) A tribunal of this state which lacks continuing, exclusive jurisdiction
over a spousal support order may not serve as a responding tribunal to modify
a spousal support order of another state.
History: C. 1953, 77-31a-206, enacted by
L. 1996, ch. 149, § 12; renumbered by L.
1997, ch. 232, § 92.
Amendment Notes. — The 1997 amendment, effective July 1, 1997, renumbered this
section, which formerly appeared as § 77-3 la-

206, and made section reference changes to
reflect the renumbering of this chapter.
Effective Dates. — Laws 1996, ch. 149
became effective on April 29, 1996, pursuant to
Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25.

78-45f-207. Recognition of controlling child support order.
(1) If a proceeding is brought under this chapter and only one tribunal has
issued a child support order, the order of that tribunal controls and must be so
recognized.
(2) If a proceeding is brought under this chapter, and two or more child
support orders have been issued by tribunals of this state or another state with
regard to the same obligor and child, a tribunal of this state shall apply the
following rules in determining which order to recognize for purposes of
continuing, exclusive jurisdiction:
(a) If only one of the tribunals would have continuing, exclusive
jurisdiction under this chapter, the order of that tribunal controls and
must be so recognized.
(b) If more than one of the tribunals would have continuing, exclusive
jurisdiction under this chapter, an order issued by a tribunal in the
current home state of the child controls and must be so recognized, but if
an order has not been issued in the current home state of the child, the
order most recently issued controls and must be so recognized.
(c) If none of the tribunals would have continuing, exclusive jurisdiction
under this chapter, the tribunal of this state having jurisdiction over the
parties shall issue a child support order, which controls and must be so
recognized.
(3) If two or more child support orders have been issued for the same obligor
and child and if the obligor or the individual obligee resides in this state, a
party may request a tribunal of this state to determine which order controls
and must be so recognized under Subsection (2). The request must be
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accompanied by a certified copy of every support order in effect. The requesting
party shall give notice of the request to each party whose rights may be
affected by the determination.
(4) The tribunal that issued the controlling order under Subsection (1), (2),
or (3) is the tribunal that has continuing, exclusive jurisdiction under Section
78-45f-205.
(5) A tribunal of this state which determines by order the identity of the
controlling order under Subsection (2)(a) or (b) or which issues a new
controlling order under Subsection (2)(c) shall state in that order the basis
upon which the tribunal made its determination.
(6) Within 30 days after issuance of an order determining the identity of the
controlling order, the party obtaining the order shall file a certified copy of it
with each tribunal that issued or registered an earlier order of child support.
A party who obtains the order and fails to file a certified copy is subject to
appropriate sanctions by a tribunal in which the issue of failure to file arises.
The failure to file does not affect the validity or enforceability of the controlling
order.
History: C. 1953, 77-31a-207, enacted by
L. 1996, ch. 149, § 13; renumbered by L.
1997, ch. 232, § 93.
Amendment Notes. — The 1997 amendment, effective July 1, 1997, renumbered this

section, which formerly appeared as § 77-3 la207, and rewrote the section.
Effective Dates. — Laws 1996, ch. 149
became effective on April 29,1996, pursuant to
Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25.

78-45f-208. Multiple child support orders for two or more
obligees.
In responding to multiple registrations or petitions for enforcement of two or
more child support orders in effect at the same time with regard to the same
obligor and different individual obligees, at least one of which was issued by a
tribunal of another state, a tribunal of this state shall enforce those orders m
the same manner as if the multiple orders had been issued by a tribunal of this
state.
History: C. 1953, 77-31a-208, enacted by
L. 1996, ch. 149, § 14; renumbered by L.
1997, ch. 232, § 94.
Amendment Notes. — The 1997 amendment, effective July 1, 1997, renumbered this

78-45f-209.

section, which formerly appeared as § 77-3 la208.
Effective Dates. — Laws 1996, ch. 149
became effective on April 29, 1996, pursuant to
Utah Const, Art. VI, Sec. 25.

Credit for payments.

Amounts collected and credited for a particular period pursuant to a support
order issued by a tribunal of another state must be credited against the
amounts accruing or accrued for the same period under a support order issued
by the tribunal of this state.
History: C. 1953, 77-31a-209, enacted by
L. 1996, ch. 149, § 15; renumbered by L.
1997, ch. 232, § 95.
Amendment Notes. — The 1997 amendment, effective July 1, 1997, renumbered this

section, which formerly appeared as § 77-3 la209.
Effective Dates. — Laws 1996, ch. 149
became effective on April 29, 1996, pursuant to
Utah Const, Art. VI, Sec. 25.
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PART 3
CIVIL PROVISIONS OF GENERAL APPLICATION
78-45f-301. Proceedings under chapter.
(1) Except as otherwise provided in this chapter, this part applies to all
proceedings under this chapter.
(2) This chapter provides for the following proceedings:
(a) establishment of an order for spousal support or child support
pursuant to Part 4;
(b) enforcement of a support order and income-withholding order of
another state without registration pursuant to Part 5;
(c) registration of an order for spousal support or child support of
another state for enforcement pursuant to Part 6;
(d) modification of an order for child support or spousal support issued
by a tribunal of this state pursuant to Sections 78-45f-203, 78-45f-204,
78-45f-205, and 78-45f-206;
(e) registration of an order for child support of another state for
modification pursuant to Part 6;
(f) determination of parentage pursuant to Part 7; and
(g) assertion of jurisdiction over nonresidents pursuant to Sections
78-45f-201 and 78-45f-202.
(3) An individual petitioner or a support enforcement agency may commence a proceeding authorized under this chapter by filing a petition in an
initiating tribunal for forwarding to a responding tribunal or by filing a
petition or a comparable pleading directly in a tribunal of another state which
has or can obtain personal jurisdiction over the respondent.
History: C. 1953, 77-31a-301, enacted by
L. 1996, ch. 149, § 16; renumbered by L.
1997, ch. 232, § 96.
Amendment Notes. — The 1997 amendment, effective July 1, 1997, renumbered this
section, which formerly appeared as § 77-3la-

301. and changed section references to reflect
the renumbering of this chapter.
Effective Dates. — Laws 1996. ch. 149
became effective on April 29, 1996, pursuant to
Utah Const., Art VI, Sec. 25.

78-45f-302, Action by minor parent.
A minor parent, or a guardian or other legal representative of a minor
parent, may maintain a proceeding on behalf of or for the benefit of the minor's
child.
History: C. 1953, 77-31a-302, enacted by
L. 1996, ch. 149, § 17; renumbered by L.
1997, ch. 232, § 97.
Amendment Notes. — The 1997 amendment, effective July 1, 1997, renumbered this

section, which formerly appeared as § 77-3 la302.
Effective Dates. — Laws 1996, ch. 149
became effective on April 29, 1996, pursuant to
Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25.

78-45f-303. Application of law of state.
Except as otherwise provided by this chapter, a responding tribunal of this
state shall:
(1) apply the procedural and substantive law, including the rules on
choice of law, generally applicable to similar proceedings originating in
this state and may exercise all powers and provide all remedies available
in those proceedings; and'
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(2) determine the duty of support and the amount payable in accordance with the law and support guidelines of this state.
History: C. 1953, 77-31a-303, enacted by
L. 1996, ch. 149, § 18; renumbered by L.
1997, ch. 232, § 98.
Amendment Notes. — The 1997 amendment, effective July 1, 1997, renumbered this

section, which formerly appeared as § 77-3la303.
Effective Dates. — Laws 1996, ch. 149
became effective on April 29,1996, pursuant to
Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25.

78-45f-304. Duties of initiating tribunal.
(1) Upon the filing of a petition authorized by this chapter, an initiating
tribunal of this state shall forward three copies of the petition and its
accompanying documents:
(a) to the responding tribunal or appropriate support enforcement
agency in the responding state; or
(b) if the identity of the responding tribunal is unknown, to the state
information agency of the responding state with a request that they be
forwarded to the appropriate tribunal and that receipt be acknowledged.
(2) If a responding state has not enacted this chapter or a law or procedure
substantially similar to this chapter, a tribunal of this state may issue a
certificate or other document and make findings required by the law of the
^sponding state. If the responding state is a foreign jurisdiction, the tribunal
.ay specify the amount of support sought and provide the other documents
necessary to satisfy the requirements of the responding state.
History; C. 1953, 77-31a-304, enacted by
L. 1996, ch. 149, § 19; renumbered by L.
1997, ch. 232, § 99.
Amendment Notes. — The 1997 amendment, effective July 1, 1997, renumbered this
section, which formerly appeared as § 77-3 la-

304, added Subsection (2), and made related
redesignations.
Effective Dates. — Laws 1996, ch. 149
became effective on April 29, 1996, pursuant to
Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25.

78-45f-305. Duties and powers of responding tribunal.
(1) When a responding tribunal of this state receives a petition or comparable pleading from an initiating tribunal or directly pursuant to Subsection
78-45f-301(2)(c), it shall cause the petition or pleading to be filed and notify the
petitioner where and when it was filed.
(2) A responding tribunal of this state, to the extent otherwise authorized by
law, may do one or more of the following:
(a) issue or enforce a support order, modify a child support order, or
render a judgment to determine parentage;
(b) order an obligor to comply with a support order, specifying the
amount and the manner of compliance;
(c) order income withholding;
(d) determine the amount of any arrearages and specify a method of
payment;
(e) enforce orders by civil or criminal contempt, or both;
(f) set aside property for satisfaction of the support order;
(g) place liens and order execution on the obligor's property;
(h) order an obligor to keep the tribunal informed of the obligor's
current residential address, telephone number, employer, address of
employment, and telephone number at the place of employment;
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(i) issue a bench warrant for an obligor who has failed after proper
notice to appear at a hearing ordered by the tribunal and enter the bench
warrant in any local and state computer systems for criminal warrants;
(j) order the obligor to seek appropriate employment by specified
methods;
(k) award reasonable attorneys' fees and other fees and costs; and
(1) grant any other available remedy.
(3) A responding tribunal of this state shall include in a support order issued
under this chapter, or in the documents accompanying the order, the calculations on which the support order is based.
(4) A responding tribunal of this state may not condition the payment of a
support order issued under this chapter upon compliance by a party with
provisions for visitation.
(5) If a responding tribunal of this state issues an order under this chapter,
the tribunal shall send a copy of the order to the petitioner and the respondent
and to the initiating tribunal, if any.
History* C. 1953, 77-31a-305, enacted by
L. 1996, ch. 149, § 20; renumbered by L.
1997, ch. 232, § 100.
Amendment Notes. — The 1997 amendment, effective July 1, 1997, renumbered this
section, which formerly appeared as § 77-3la305, deleted "by first class mail" after "the

78-45f-306.

petitioner" in Subsection (1), deleted "by first
class mail" after "the order" in Subsection (5),
and changed a section reference to reflect the
renumbering of this chapter,
Effective Dates. — Laws 1996, ch. 149
became effective on April 29,1996, pursuant to
Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25.

Inappropriate tribunal.

If a petition or comparable pleading is received by an inappropriate tribunal
of this state, it shall forward the pleading and accompanying documents to an
appropriate tribunal in this state or another state and notify the petitioner
where and when the pleading was sent.
History: C. 1953, 77«31a-306, enacted by
L. 1996, ch. 149, § 21; renumbered by L.
1997, ch. 232, § 101.
Amendment Notes. — The 1997 amendment, effective July 1, 1997, renumbered this
section, which formerly appeared as § 77-3la-

78-45f-307.

306, and deleted "by first class mail" after "the
petitioner."
Effective Dates. — Laws 1996, ch. 149
became effective on April 29, 1996, pursuant to
Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25.

Duties of support enforcement agency.

(1) A support enforcement agency of this state, upon request, shall provide
services to a petitioner in a proceeding under this chapter.
(2) A support enforcement agency that is providing services to the petitioner
as appropriate shall:
(a) take all steps necessary to enable an appropriate tribunal in this
state or another state to obtain jurisdiction over the respondent;
(b) request an appropriate tribunal to set a date, time, and place for a
hearing;
(c) make a reasonable effort to obtain all relevant information, including information as to income and property of the parties;
(d) within ten days, exclusive of Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays, after receipt of a written notice from an initiating, responding, or
registering tribunal, send a copy of the notice to the petitioner;
(e) within ten days, exclusive of Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays, after receipt of a written communication from the respondent or the
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respondent's attorney, send a copy of the communication to the petitioner;
and
(f) notify the petitioner if jurisdiction over the respondent cannot be
obtained.
(3) This chapter does not create or negate a relationship of attorney and
client or other fiduciary relationship between a support enforcement agency or
the attorney for the agency and the individual being assisted by the agency.
History: C. 1953, 77-31a-307, enacted by
L. 1996, ch. 149, § 22; renumbered by L.
1997, ch. 232, § 102.
Amendment Notes. — The 1997 amendment, effective July 1, 1997, renumbered this
section, which formerly appeared as § 77-3la-

307, and substituted "ten days" for "two days"
and deleted "by first class mair before "to the
petitioner" in Subsections (2)(d) and (2)(e).
Effective Dates. — Laws 1996, ch. 149
became effective on April 29, 1996, pursuant to
Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25.

78-45f-308. Duty of attorney general.
If the attorney general determines that the support enforcement agency is
neglecting or refusing to provide services to an individual, the attorney general
may order the agency to perform its duties under this chapter or may provide
those services directly to the individual.
History: C. 1953, 77-31a-308, enacted by
L. 1996, ch. 149, § 23; renumbered by L.
1997, ch. 232, § 103.
Amendment Notes. — The 1997 amendment, effective July 1, 1997, renumbered this

section, which formerly appeared as § 77-31a308.
Effective Dates. — Laws 1996, ch. 149
became effective on April 29, 1996, pursuant to
Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25.

78-45f-309. Private counsel.
An individual may employ private counsel to represent the individual in
proceedings authorized by this chapter.
History: C. 1953, 77-31a-309, enacted by
L. 1996, ch. 149, § 24; renumbered by L.
1997, ch. 232, § 104.
Amendment Notes. — The 1997 amendment, effective July 1, 1997, renumbered this

section, which formerly appeared as § 77-3la309.
Effective Dates. — Laws 1996, ch. 149
became effective on April 29, 1996, pursuant to
Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25.

78-45f-310. Duties of state information agency.
(1) The Office of Recovery Services is the state information agency under
this chapter.
(2) The state information agency shall:
(a) compile and maintain a current list, including addresses, of the
tribunals in this state which have jurisdiction under this chapter and any
support enforcement agencies in this state and transmit a copy to the state
information agency of every other state;
(b) maintain a register of tribunals and support enforcement agencies
received from other states;
(c) forward to the appropriate tribunal in the place in this state in
which the individual obligee or the obligor Tesides, or in which the obligor's
property is believed to be located, all documents concerning a proceeding
under this chapter received from an initiating tribunal or the state
information agency of the initiating state; and
(d) obtain information concerning the location of the obligor and the
obligor's property within this state not exempt from execution, by such
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means as postal verification and federal or state locator services, examination of telephone directories, requests for the obligor's address from
employers, and examination of governmental records, including, to the
extent not prohibited by law, those relating to real property, vital records,
law enforcement, taxation, motor vehicles, driver's licenses, and Social
Security number.
History: C. 1953, 77-31a-310, enacted by
L. 1996, ch. 149, § 25; renumbered by L.
1997, ch. 232, § 105.
Amendment Notes. — The 1997 amendment, effective July 1, 1997, renumbered this

78-45f-311.

section, which formerly appeared as § 77-3 la310.
Effective Dates. — Laws 1996, ch. 149
became effective on April 29, 1996, pursuant to
Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25.

Pleadings and accompanying documents.

(1) A petitioner seeking to establish or modify a support order or to
determine parentage in a proceeding under this chapter must verify the
petition. Unless otherwise ordered under Section 78-45f-312, the petition or
accompanying documents must provide, so far as known, the name, residential
address, and Social Security numbers of the obligor and the obligee, and the
name, sex, residential address, Social Security number, and date of birth of
each child for whom support is sought. The petition must be accompanied by a
certified copy of any support order in effect. The petition may include any other
information that may assist in locating or identifying the respondent.
(2) The petition must specify the relief sought. The petition and accompanying documents must conform substantially with the requirements imposed
by the forms mandated by federal law for use in cases filed by a support
enforcement agency.
History: C. 1953, 77-31a-311, enacted by
L. 1996, ch. 149, § 26; renumbered by L.
1997, ch. 232, § 106.
Amendment Notes. — The 1997 amendment, effective July 1, 1997, renumbered this
section, which formerly appeared as § 77-3la-

311, and changed a section reference to reflect
the renumbering of this chapter.
Effective Dates. — Laws 1996, ch. 149
became effective on April 29, 1996, pursuant to
Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25.

78-45f-312. Nondisclosure of information in exceptional
circumstances.
Upon a finding, which may be made ex parte, that the health, safety, or
liberty of a party or child would be unreasonably put at risk by the disclosure
of identifying information, or if an existing order so provides, a tribunal shall
order that the address of the child or party or other identifying information not
be disclosed in a pleading or other document filed in a proceeding under this
chapter.
History? C. 1953, 77-31a-312, enacted by
L. 1996, ch. 149, § 27; renumbered by L.
1997, ch. 232, § 107.
Amendment Notes. — The 1997 amendment, effective July 1, 1997, renumbered this

78-45f-313.

section, which formerly appeared as § 77-31a312.
Effective Dates. — Laws 1996, ch. 149
became effective on April 29, 1996, pursuant to
Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25.

Costs and fees.

(1) The petitioner may not be required to pay a filing fee or other costs.
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(2) If an obligee prevails, a responding tribunal may assess against an
obligor filing fees, reasonable attorneys' fees, other costs, and necessary travel
and other reasonable expenses incurred by the obligee and the obligee's
witnesses. The tribunal may not assess fees, costs, or expenses against the
obligee or the support enforcement agency of either the initiating or the
responding state, except as provided by law. Attorney's fees may be taxed as
costs, and may be ordered paid directly to the attorney, who may enforce the
order in the attorney's own name. Payment of support owed to the obligee has
priority over fees, costs, and expenses.
(3) The tribunal shall order the payment of costs and reasonable attorneys'
fees if it determines that a hearing was requested primarily for delay. In a
proceeding under Part 6 a hearing is presumed to have been requested
primarily for delay if a registered support order is confirmed or enforced
without change.
History: C. 1953, 77-31a-313, enacted by
L. 1996, ch. 149, § 28; renumbered by L.
1997, ch. 232, § 108.
Amendment Notes. — The 1997 amendment, effective July 1, 1997, renumbered this

section, which formerly appeared as § 77-31a313.
Effective Dates. — Laws 1996, ch. 149
became effective on April 29,1996, pursuant to
Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25.

78-45f-314. Limited immunity of petitioner.
(1) Participation by a petitioner in a proceeding before a responding
tribunal, whether in person, by private attorney, or through services provided
by the support enforcement agency, does not confer personal jurisdiction over
the petitioner in another proceeding.
(2) A petitioner is not amenable to service of civil process while physically
present in this state to participate in a proceeding under this chapter.
(3) The immunity granted by this section does not extend to civil litigation
based on acts unrelated to a proceeding under this chapter committed by a
party while present in this state to participate in the proceeding.
History: C. 1953, 77-31a-314, enacted by
L. 1996, ch. 149, § 29; renumbered by L.
1997, ch. 232, § 109.
Amendment Notes. — The 1997 amendment, effective July 1, 1997, renumbered this

section, which formerly appeared as § 77-31a314.
Effective Dates. — Laws 1996, ch. 149
became effective on April 29, 1996, pursuant to
Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25.

78-45f-315. Nonparentage as defense.
A party whose parentage of a child has been previously determined by or
pursuant to law may not plead nonparentage as a defense to a proceeding
under this chapter.
History: C. 1953, 77-31a-315, enacted by
L. 1996, ch. 149, § 30; renumbered by L.
1997, ch. 232, § 110.
Amendment Notes. — The 1997 amendment, effective July 1, 1997, renumbered this

78-45f-316.

section, which formerly appeared as § 77-3la315.
Effective Dates. — Laws 1996, ch. 149
became effective on April 29, 1996, pursuant to
Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25.

Special rules of evidence and procedure.

(1) The physical presence of the petitioner in a responding tribunal of this
state is not required for the establishment, enforcement, or modification of a
support order or the rendition of a judgment determining parentage.
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(2) A verified petition, affidavit, or document substantially complying with
federally mandated forms, and a document incorporated by reference in any of
them, not excluded under the hearsay rule if given in person, is admissible in
evidence if given under oath by a party or witness residing in another state.
(3) A copy of the record of child support payments certified as a true copy of
the original by the custodian of the record may be forwarded to a responding
tribunal. The copy is evidence of facts asserted in it and is admissible to show
whether payments were made.
(4) Copies of bills for testing for parentage, and for prenatal and postnatal
health care of the mother and child, furnished to the adverse party at least ten
days before trial, are admissible in evidence to prove the amount of the charges
billed and that the charges were reasonable, necessary, and customary.
(5) Documentary evidence transmitted from another state to a tribunal of
this state by telephone, telecopier, or other means that do not provide an
original writing may not be excluded from evidence on an objection based on
the means of transmission.
(6) In a proceeding under this chapter, a tribunal of this state may permit a
party or witness residing in another state to be deposed or to testify by
telephone, audiovisual means, or other electronic means at a designated
tribunal or other location in that state. A tribunal of this state shall cooperate
with tribunals of other states in designating an appropriate location for the
deposition or testimony.
(7) If a party called to testify at a civil hearing refuses to answer on the
ground that the testimony may be self-incriminating, the trier of fact may
draw an adverse inference from the refusal.
(8) A privilege against disclosure of communications between spouses does
not apply in a proceeding under this chapter.
(9) The defense of immunity based on the relationship of husband and wife
or parent and child does not apply in a proceeding under this chapter.
History: C. 1953, 78-45f-316, enacted by
L. 1997, ch. 232, & 111.

78-45f-317.

Effective Dates. — Laws 1997, ch. 232,
§ 142 makes the act effective on July 1, 1997.

Communications between tribunals.

A tribunal of this state may communicate with a tribunal of another state in
writing, or by telephone or other means, to obtain information concerning the
laws of that state, the legal effect of a judgment, decree, or order of that
tribunal, and the status of a proceeding in the other state. A tribunal of this
state may furnish similar information by similar means to a tribunal of
another state.
History: C. 1953, 77-31a-317, enacted by
L. 1996, ch. 149, § 31; renumbered by L.
1997, ch. 232, § 112.
Amendment Notes. — The 1997 amendment, effective July 1, 1997, renumbered this

section, which formerly appeared as § 77-31a317.
Effective Dates. — Laws 1996, ch. 149
became effective on April 29, 1996, pursuant to
Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25.

78-45f-318. Assistance with discovery.
A tribunal of this state may:
(1) request a tribunal of another state to assist in obtaining discovery;
and
(2) upon request, compel a person over whom it has jurisdiction to
respond to a discovery order issued by a tribunal of another state.

78-45f-319
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History: C. 1953, 77-31a-318, enacted by
L. 1996, ch. 149, § 32; renumbered by L.
1997, ch. 232, § 113.
Amendment Notes. — The 1997 amendment, effective July 1, 1997, renumbered this

78-45f-319,
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section, which formerly appeared as § 77-3ia.
318.
Effective Dates. — Laws 1996, ch. 149
became effective on April 29,1996, pursuant to
Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25.

Receipt and disbursement of payments.

A support enforcement agency or tribunal of this state shall disburse
promptly any amounts received pursuant to a support order, as directed by the
order. The agency or tribunal shall furnish to a requesting party or tribunal of
another state a certified statement by the custodian of the record of the
amounts and dates of all payments received.
History: C. 1953, 77-31a-319, enacted by
L. 1996, ch. 149, § 33; renumbered by L.
1997, ch. 232, § 114.
Amendment Notes. — The 1997 amendment, effective July 1, 1997, renumbered this

section, which formerly appeared as § 77-31a319.
Effective Dates. — Laws 1996, ch. 149
became effective on April 29, 1996, pursuant to
Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25.

PART 4
ESTABLISHMENT OF SUPPORT ORDER
78-45f-401. Petition to establish support order.
(1) If a support order entitled to recognition under this chapter has not been
issued, a responding tribunal of this state may issue a support order if:
(a) the individual seeking the order resides in another state; or
(b) the support enforcement agency seeking the order is located in
another state.
(2) The tribunal may issue a temporary child support order if:
(a) the respondent has signed a verified statement acknowledging
parentage;
(b) the respondent has been determined by or pursuant to law to be the
parent; or
(c) there is other clear and convincing evidence that the respondent is
the child's parent.
(3) Upon finding, after notice and opportunity to be heard, that an obligor
owes a duty of support, the tribunal shall issue a support order directed to the
obligor and may issue other orders pursuant to Section 78-45f-305.
History: C. 1953, 77-31a-401, enacted by
L. 1996, ch. 149, § 34; renumbered by L.
1997, ch. 232, § 115.
Amendment Notes. — The 1997 amendment, effective July 1, 1997, renumbered this
section, which formerly appeared as § 77-3la-

401, and changed a section reference to reflect
the redesignation of this chapter.
Effective Dates. — Laws 1996, ch. 149
became effective on April 29,1996, pursuant to
Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25.
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PART 5
ENFORCEMENT OF ORDER OF ANOTHER STATE
WITHOUT REGISTRATION
78-45f-501. Employer's receipt of income-withholding order of another state.
An income-withholding order issued in another state may be sent to the
person or entity defined as the obligor's employer under Title 62A, Chapter 11,
Part 4, Income Withholding, without first filing a petition or comparable
pleading or registering the order with a tribunal of this state.
History: C. 1953, 77-31a-501, enacted by
L. 1996, ch. 149, § 35; renumbered by L.
1997, ch. 232, § 116.
Amendment Notes. — The 1997 amendment, effective July 1, 1997, renumbered this
section, which formerly appeared as § 77-31a501, deleted "by first class mail" after "may be

sent," and deleted provisions prescribing the
employer's duties upon receipt of the withholding order.
Effective Dates. — Laws 1996, ch. 149
became effective on April 29, 1996, pursuant to
Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25.

78-45f-502. Employer's compliance with income withholding of another state.
(1) Upon receipt of an income withholding order, the obligor's employer shall
immediately provide a copy of the order to the obligor.
(2) The employer shall treat an income withholding order issued in another
state which appears regular on its face as if it had been issued by a tribunal of
this state.
(3) Except as otherwise provided in Subsection (4) and Section 78-45f-503,
the employer shall withhold and distribute the funds as directed in the
withholding order by complying with terms of the order which specify:
(a) the duration and amount of periodic payments of current child
support, stated as a sum certain;
(b) the person or agency designated to receive payments and the
address to which the payments are to be forwarded;
(c) medical support, whether in the form of periodic cash payment,
stated as a sum certain, or ordering the obligor to provide health insurance
coverage for the child under a policy available through the obligor's
employment;
(d) the amount of periodic payments of fees and costs for a support
enforcement agency, the issuing tribunal, and the obligee's attorney, stated
as sums certain; and
(e) the amount of periodic payments of arrearages and interest on
arrearages, stated as sums certain.
(4) An employer shall comply with the law of the state of the obligor's
principal place of employment for withholding from income with respect to:
(a) the employer's fee for processing an income withholding order;
(b) the maximum amount permitted to be withheld from the obligor's
income; and
(c) the times within which the employer must implement the withholding order and forward the child support payment.
History: C. 1953, 78-45f-502, enacted by
L. 1997, ch. 232, § 117.

Effective Dates. — Laws 1997, ch. 232,
* 142 makes the act effective on July 1, 1997.

78-45f-503
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78-45f-503. Compliance with multiple income withholding orders.
If an obligor's employer receives multiple income withholding orders with
respect to the earnings of the same obligor, the employer satisfies the terms of
the multiple orders if the employer complies with the law of the state of the
obligor's principal place of employment to establish the priorities for the
withholding and allocating income withheld for multiple child support
obligees.
History: C. 1953, 78-45f-503, enacted by
L. 1997, ch. 232, § 118.

78-45f-504.

Effective Dates. — Laws 1997, ch. 232,
§ 142 makes the act effective on July 1, 1997.

Immunity from civil liability.

An employer who complies with an income withholding order issued in
another state in accordance with this part is not subject to civil liability to an
individual or agency with regard to the employer's withholding of child support
*Vom the obligor's income.
History: C. 1953, 78-45f-504, enacted by
L. 1997, ch. 232, § 119.

Effective Dates. — Laws 1997, ch. 232,
§ 142 makes the act effective on July 1, 1997.

78-45f-505. Penalties for noncompliance.
An employer who willfully fails to comply with an income withholding order
issued by another state and received for enforcement is subject to the same
penalties that may be imposed for noncompliance with an order issued by a
tribunal of this state.
History: C. 1953, 78-45f-505, enacted by
L. 1997, ch. 232, § 120.

78-45f-506.

Effective Dates. — Laws 1997, ch. 232,
§ 142 makes the act effective on July 1, 1997.

Contest by obligor.

(1) An obligor may contest the validity or enforcement of an income
withholding order issued in another state and received directly by an employer
in this state in the same manner as if the order had been issued by a tribunal
of this state. Section 78-45f-604 applies to the contest.
(2) The obligor shall give notice of the contest to:
(a) a support enforcement agency providing services to the obligee;
(b) each employer that has directly received an income withholding
order; and
(c) the person or agency designated to receive payments in the income
withholding order or if no person or agency is designated, to the obligee.
History: C. 1953, 78-45f-506, enacted by
L. 1997, ch. 232, § 121.

78-45f-507.

Effective Dates. — Laws 1997, ch. 232,
§ 142 makes the act effective on July 1, 1997.

Administrative enforcement of orders.

(1)A party seeking to enforce a support order or an income-withholding
order, or both, issued by a tribunal of another state may send the documents
required for registering the order to a support enforcement agency of this state.
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(2) Upon receipt of the documents, the support enforcement agency, without
initially seeking to register the order, shall consider and, if appropriate, use
any administrative procedure authorized by the law of this state to enforce a
support order or an income-withholding order, or both. If the obligor does not
contest administrative enforcement, the order need not be registered. If the
obligor contests the validity or administrative enforcement of the order, the
support enforcement agency shall register the order pursuant to this chapter.
History: C. 1953, 77-31a-502, enacted by
L. 1996, ch. 149, § 36; renumbered by L.
1997, ch. 232, § 122.
Amendment Notes. — The 1997 amendment, effective July 1, 1997, renumbered this

section, which formerly appeared as § 77-3 la502.
Effective Dates. — Laws 1996, ch. 149
became effective on April 29,1996, pursuant to
Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25.

PART 6
ENFORCEMENT AND MODIFICATION OF SUPPORT
ORDER AFTER REGISTRATION
78-45f-601. Registration of order for enforcement.
A support order or an income-withholding order issued by a tribunal of
another state may be registered in this state for enforcement.
History: C. 1953, 77-31a-601, enacted by
L. 1996, ch. 149, § 37; renumbered by L.
1997, ch. 232, § 123.
Amendment Notes. — The 1997 amendment, effective July 1, 1997, renumbered this

section, which formerly appeared as § 77-31a601.
Effective Dates. — Laws 1996, ch. 149
became effective on April 29,1996, pursuant to
Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25.

78-45f-602. Procedure to register order for enforcement.
(1) A support order or income-withholding order of another state may be
registered in this state by sending the following documents and information to
the appropriate tribunal in this state:
(a) a letter of transmittal to the tribunal requesting registration and
enforcement;
(b) two copies, including one certified copy, of all orders to be registered,
including any modification of an order;
(c) a sworn statement by the party seeking registration or a certified
statement by the custodian of the records showing the amount of any
arrearage;
(d) the name of the obligor and, if known:
(i) the obligor's address and Social Security number;
(ii) the name and address of the obligor's employer and any other
source of income of the obligor; and
(iii) a description and the location of property of the obligor in this
state not exempt from execution; and
(e) the name and address of the obligee and, if applicable, the agency or
person to whom support payments are to be remitted.
(2) On receipt of a request for registration, the registering tribunal shall
cause the order to be filed as a foreign judgment, together with one copy of the
documents and information, regardless of their form.
(3) A petition seeking a remedy that must be affirmatively sought under law
of this state may be filed at the same time as the request for registration or
later. The pleading must specify the grounds for the remedy sought.

78-45f-603

JUDICIAL CODE

History2 C. 1953, 77-31a-602, enacted by
* 1996, ch. 149, § 38; renumbered by L.
1997, ch. 232, § 124.
Amendment Notes. — The 1997 amendment, effective July 1, 1997, renumbered this
section, which formerly appeared as § 77-31a-
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602, and substituted "appropriate tribunal" fop
"district court" in the introductory paragraph in
Subsection (1).
Effective Dates. — Laws 1996, ch. 149
became effective on April 29, 1996, pursuant to
Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25.

78-45f-603. Effect of registration for enforcement.
(1) A support order or income-withholding order issued in another state is
registered when the order is filed in the registering tribunal of this state.
(2) A registered order issued in another state is enforceable in the same
manner and is subject to the same procedures as an order issued by a tribunal
of this state.
(3) Except as otherwise provided in this part, a tribunal of this state shall
recognize and enforce, but may not modify, a registered order if the issuing
tribunal had jurisdiction.
History: C. 1953, 77-31a-603, enacted by
L. 1996, ch. 149, § 39; renumbered by L.
1997, ch. 232, § 125.
Amendment Notes. — The 1997 amendment, effective July 1, 1997, renumbered this

78-45f-604.

section, which formerly appeared as § 77-3 la603.
Effective Dates. — Laws 1996, ch. 149
became effective on April 29, 1996, pursuant to
Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25.

Choice of law.

(1) The law of the issuing state governs the nature, extent, amount, and
duration of current payments and other obligations of support and the
payment of arrearages under the order.
(2) In a proceeding for arrearages, the statute of limitation under the laws
of this state or of the issuing state, whichever is longer, applies.
History^ C. 1953, 77-31a-604, enacted by
L. 1996, ch. 149, § 40; renumbered by L.
1997, ch. 232, § 126.
Amendment Notes. — The 1997 amendment, effective July 1, 1997, renumbered this

section, which formerly appeared as § 77-3la604.
Effective Dates. — Laws 1996, ch. 149
became effective on April 29, 1996, pursuant to
Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25.

78-45f-605. Notice of registration of order*
(1) When a support order or income-withholding order issued in another
state is registered, the registering tribunal shall notify the nonregistering
party. The notice must be accompanied by a copy of the registered order and
the documents and relevant information accompanying the order.
(2) The notice must inform the nonregistering party:
(a) that a registered order is enforceable as of the date of registration in
the same manner as an order issued by a tribunal of this state;
(b) that a hearing to contest the validity or enforcement of the registered order must be requested within 20 days after notice;
(c) that failure to contest the validity or enforcement of the registered
order in a timely manner will result in confirmation of the order and
enforcement of the order and the alleged arrearages and precludes further
contest of that order with respect to any matter that could have been
asserted; and
(d) of the amount of any alleged arrearages.
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(3) Upon registration of an income-withholding order for enforcement, the
registering tribunal shall notify the obligor's employer pursuant to Title 62A,
Chapter 11, Part 4, Income Withholding.
History: C. 1953, 77-31a-605, enacted by
L. 1996, ch. 149, § 41; renumbered by L.
1997, ch. 232, § 127.
Amendment Notes. — The 1997 amendment, effective July 1, 1997, renumbered this
section, which formerly appeared as § 77-31a605, deleted a sentence specifying how notice

must be given in Subsection (1), and deleted
"the date of mailing or personal service of the"
after a20 days after" in Subsection (2Kb).
Effective Dates. — Laws 1996, ch. 149
became effective on April 29,1996, pursuant to
Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25.

78-45f-606. Procedure to contest validity or enforcement
of registered order.
(1) A nonregistering party seeking to contest the validity or enforcement of
a registered order in this state shall request a hearing within 20 days after
notice of the registration. The nonregistering party may seek to vacate the
registration, to assert any defense to an allegation of noncompliance with the
registered order, or to contest the remedies being sought or the amount of any
alleged arrearages pursuant to this section.
(2) If the nonregistering party fails to contest the validity or enforcement of
the registered order in a timely manner, the order is confirmed by operation of
law.
(3) If a nonregistering party requests a hearing to contest the validity or
enforcement of the registered order, the registering tribunal shall schedule the
matter for hearing and give notice to the parties of the date, time, and place of
the hearing.
History: C. 1953, 77-31a-606, enacted by
L. 1996, ch. 149, § 42; renumbered by L.
1997, ch. 232, § 128.
Amendment Notes. — The 1997 amendment, effective July 1, 1997, renumbered this
section, which formerly appeared as § 77-3la-

78-45f-607.

606, deleted references to a mailing of the
notice requirement, and made a stylistic
change.
Effective Dates. — Laws 1996, ch. 149
became effective on April 29, 1996, pursuant to
Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25.

Contest of r e g i s t r a t i o n or enforcement.

(1) A party contesting the validity or enforcement of a registered order or
seeking to vacate the registration has the burden of proving one or more of the
following defenses:
(a) the issuing tribunal lacked personal jurisdiction over the contesting
party;
(b) the order was obtained by fraud;
(c) the order has been vacated, suspended, or modified by a later order;
(d) the issuing tribunal has stayed the order pending appeal;
(e) there is a defense under the law of this state to the remedy sought;
(f) full or partial payment has been made; or
(g) the statute of limitation under Section 78-45f-604 precludes enforcement of some or all of the arrearages.
(2) If a party presents evidence establishing a full or partial defense under
Subsection (1), a tribunal may stay enforcement of the registered order,
continue the proceeding to permit production of additional relevant evidence,
and issue other appropriate orders. An uncontested portion of the registered
order may be enforced by all remedies available under the law of this state.

78-45f-608
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(3) If the contesting party does not establish a defense under Subsection (1)
to the validity or enforcement of the order, the registering tribunal shall issue
an order confirming the order.
History: C. 1953, 77-31a-607, enacted by
L. 1996, ch. 149, § 43; renumbered by L.
1997, ch. 232, § 129.
Amendment Notes. — The 1997 amendment, effective July 1, 1997, renumbered this
section, which formerly appeared as § 77-3 la-

78-45f-608.

607, and made a section reference change to
reflect the renumbering of this chapter.
Effective Dates. — Laws 1996, ch. 149
became effective on April 29, 1996, pursuant to
Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25.

Confirmed order.

Confirmation of a registered order, whether by operation of law or after
notice and hearing, precludes further contest of the order with respect to any
matter that could have been asserted at the time of registration.
History: C. 1953, 77-31a-608, enacted by
L. 1996, ch. 149, § 44; renumbered by L.
1997, ch. 232, § 130.
Amendment Notes. — The 1997 amendment, effective July 1, 1997, renumbered this

section, which formerly appeared as § 77-3 la608.
Effective Dates. — Laws 1996, ch. 149
became effective on April 29, 1996, pursuant to
Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25.

78-45f-609. Procedure to register child support order of
another state for modification.
A party or support enforcement agency seeking to modify, or to modify and
enforce, a child support order issued in another state shall register that order
in this state in the same manner provided in Sections 78-45f-601, 78-45f-602,
78-45f-603, and 78-45f-604 if the order has not been registered. A petition for
modification may be filed at the same time as a request for registration, or
later. The pleading must specify the grounds for modification.
History: C. 1953, 77-31a-609, enacted by
L. 1996, ch. 149, § 45; renumbered by L.
1997, ch. 232, § 131.
Amendment Notes. — The 1997 amendment, effective July 1, 1997, renumbered this
section, which formerly appeared as § 77-3 la-

609, and made section reference changes to
reflect the renumbering of this chapter.
Effective Dates. — Laws 1996. ch. 149
became effective on April 29, 1996, pursuant to
Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25.

78-45f-610. Effect of registration for modification.
A tribunal of this state may enforce a child support order of another state
registered for purposes of modification, in the same manner as if the order had
been issued by a tribunal of this state, but the registered order may be modified
only if the requirements of Section 78-45f-611 have been met.
History: C. 1953, 77-31a-610, enacted by
L. 1996, ch. 149, § 46; renumbered by L.
1997, ch. 232, § 132.
Amendment Notes. — The 1997 amendment, effective July 1, 1997, renumbered this
section, which formerly appeared as § 77-3 la-

610, and made a section reference change to
reflect the renumbering of this chapter.
Effective Dates. — Laws 1996, ch. 149
became effective on April 29. 1996, pursuant to
Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25.
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78-45f-611. Modification of child support order of another
state.
(1) After a child support order issued in another state has been registered in
this state, the responding tribunal of this state may modify that order only if
Section 78-45f-613 does not apply and after notice and hearing it finds that:
(a) the following requirements are met:
(i) the child, the individual obligee, and the obligor do not reside in
the issuing state;
(ii) a petitioner who is a nonresident of this state seeks modification; and
(iii) the respondent is subject to the personal jurisdiction of the
tribunal of this state; or
(b) the child, or a party who is an individual, is subject to the personal
jurisdiction of the tribunal of this state and all of the parties who are
individuals have filed written consents in the issuing tribunal for a
tribunal of this state to modify the support order and assume continuing,
exclusive jurisdiction over the order. However, if the issuing state is a
foreign jurisdiction that has not enacted a law or established procedures
substantially similar to the procedures under this chapter, the consent
otherwise required of an individual residing in this state is not required
for the tribunal to assume jurisdiction to modify the child support order.
(2) Modification of a registered child support order is subject to the same
requirements, procedures, and defenses that apply to the modification of an
order issued by a tribunal of this state and the order may be enforced and
satisfied in the same manner.
(3) A tribunal of this state may not modify any aspect of a child support
order that may not be modified under the law of the issuing state. If two or
more tribunals have issued child support orders for the same obligor and child,
the order that controls and must be so recognized under Section 78-45f-207
establishes the aspects of the support order which are nonmodifiable.
(4) On issuance of an order modifying a child support order issued in
another state, a tribunal of this state becomes the tribunal of continuing,
exclusive jurisdiction.
History: C. 1953, 77-31a-611, enacted by
L. 1996, ch. 149, § 47; renumbered by L.
1997, ch. 232, § 133.
Amendment Notes. — The 1997 amendment, effective July 1, 1997, renumbered this

section, which formerly appeared as § 77-3 la611, and rewrote the section.
Effective Dates. — Laws 1996, ch. 149
became effective on April 29, 1996, pursuant to
Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25.

78-45f-612. Recognition of order modified in another
state.
A tribunal of this state shall recognize a modification of its earlier child
support order by a tribunal of another state which assumed jurisdiction
pursuant to a law substantially similar to this chapter and, upon request,
except as otherwise provided in this chapter, shall:
(1) enforce the order that was modified only as to amounts accruing
before the modification;
(2) enforce only nonmodifiable aspects of that order;
(3) provide other appropriate relief only for violations of that order
which occurred before the effective date of the modification; and
(4) recognize the modifying order of the other state, upon registration,
for the purpose of enforcement.

78-45f-613
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History: C. 1953, 77-31a-612, enacted by
L. 1996, ch. 149, § 48; renumbered by L.
1997, ch. 232, § 134.
Amendment Notes. — The 1997 amendment, effective July 1, 1997, renumbered this
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section, which formerly appeared as § 77-3ia.
612.
Effective Dates. — Laws 1996, ch. 149
became effective on April 29,1996, pursuant to
Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25.

78-45f-613. Jurisdiction to modify child support order of
another state when individual parties reside in
this state.
(1) If all of the parties who are individuals reside in this state and the child
does not reside in the issuing state, a tribunal of this state has jurisdiction to
enforce and to modify the issuing state's child support order in a proceeding to
register that order.
(2) A tribunal of this state exercising jurisdiction under this section shall
apply the provisions of Parts 1 and 2, this part, and the procedural and
substantive law of this state to the proceeding for enforcement of modification.
Parts 3, 4, 5, 7, and 8 do not apply.
History: C. 1953, 78-45f-613, enacted by
L. 1997, ch. 232, § 135.

Effective Dates. — Laws 1997, ch. 232,
§ 142 makes the act effective on July 1, 1997.

78-45f-614. Notice to issuing tribunal of modification.
Within 30 days after issuance of a modified child support order, the party
obtaining the modification shall file a certified copy of the order with the
issuing tribunal that had continuing, exclusive jurisdiction over the earlier
order, and in each tribunal in which the party knows the earlier order has been
registered. A party who obtains the order and fails to file a certified copy is
subject to appropriate sanctions by a tribunal in which the issue of failure to
file arises. The failure to file does not affect the validity or enforceability of the
modified order of the new tribunal having continuing, exclusive jurisdiction.
History: C. 1953, 78-45f-614, enacted by
L. 1997, ch. 232, fc 136.

Effective Dates. — Laws 1997, ch. 232,
§ 142 makes the act effective on July 1, 1997.

PART 7
DETERMINATION OF PARENTAGE
78-45f-701.

Proceeding to determine parentage.

(1) A tribunal of this state may serve as an initiating or responding tribunal
in a proceeding brought under this chapter or a law substantially similar to
this chapter or the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act, to
determine that the petitioner is a parent of a particular child or to determine
that a respondent is a parent of that child.
(2) In a proceeding to determine parentage, a responding tribunal of this
state shall apply Title 78, Chapter 45a, Uniform Act on Paternity, and the rules
of this state on choice of law.
History: C. 1953, 77-31a-701, enacted by
L. 1996, ch. 149, § 49; renumbered by L.
1997, ch. 232, § 137.
Amendment Notes. — The 1997 amendment, effective July 1, 1997, renumbered this
section, which formerly appeared as § 77-31a-

701, and deleted "Title 77, Chapter 31" before
"the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act" in Subsection (1).
Effective Dates. — Laws 1996, ch. 149
became effective on April 29, 1996, pursuant to
Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25.

ADDENDUM B

Renee M. Jimenez #5974
Assistant Attorney General
JAN GRAHAM #1231
Attorney General
Attorney for State of Utah
515 East 100 South, Eighth Floor
P.O. Box 1980
Salt Lake City, UT 84110
Telephone: (801) 536-8300
Fax:(801)536-8315

^IMBHT

FEB 0 6 1998

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
2.2. 2 , 0 4 - ^ 1
STATE OF UTAH, Department of
Human Services, ex rel.,
STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA, ex rel.
ROBIN KIRBY,

JUDGMENT AND ORDER

Plaintiffs,

Judge WILLIAM BOHLING

vs.

Civil No. 970902869

Comm LISA A. JONES

AVI ALEX JACOBY,
Defendant.

The foregoing matter came before the court upon the State of Utah's Notice to Submit for
Decision pursuant to rule 4-501 (d) of the Code of Judicial Administration. The court having previously
made and entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law based upon the legal briefs and reply
briefs from both parties, the argument of counsel and after due and full consideration of the facts and
good cause appearing now therefore;
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IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AND ADJUDGED AS FOLLOWS:
1. A judgment shall enter against the Defendant and in favor of the State of Utah for the use and
benefit of the initiating jurisdiction in the sum of $55,887.05, representing child support arrears for the
period from December 1985 through November 1997.
2. The above judgment shall bear interest at the rate of 7.468 percent per annum.
3. All support payments shall be made to the Office of Recovery Services, P.O. Box 45011, Salt
Lake City, Utah 84145-0001, unless the Office gives written notice that payment s should be sent
elsewhere.
4. Immediate and automatic income withholding shall apply for the collection is child support.
5. The issue of the Defendant's contempt for failure to pay support continues to be certified for
future hearing.
DATED this

\

day of

/lU^M

<r

, 1998.

BY THE COURT:

WILLIAM BOHLING
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the

' ^ day of ^^Uz4^<^>W , 1998,1 caused to be mailed a true and
/

correct copy of the foregoing Judgment and Order to the following individuals at the following
addresses:
Mr. Avi Alex Jacoby
2318 0akcrestDrive
Salt Lake City, Ut 84121
Mr. Avi Alex Jacoby
9355 South 1300 East
Sandy, Ut 84094
Robin Kirby
#2 Wallis Court
Lexington, Ma 02173

/yjiA.
Myrna/Bright
Legal/Secretary
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CERTIFICATE OF MAIUNQ
I herebv certifv that on the

f_ dav of ^I^UAJTA^^I

~

, 1998,1 caused to be mailed a true and

T

correct copy of the foregoing Judgment and Order to the following individuals at the following
addresses:
Mr. Avi Alex Jacobv
2318 Oakcrest Drive
Salt Lake City. Ut 84121
Mr. Avi Alex Jacobv
9355 South 1300 East
Sandy, Ut 84094
Robin Kirbv
#2 Wallis Court
Lexington. Ma 02173
/

Myrna/Bright
Legal Secretary
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH, Department of
Human Services, ex rel.,
STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA, ex rel.
ROBIN KIRBY,

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Civil No. 970902869

Plaintiffs,
Judge WILLIAM BOHLING
vs.

Comm LISA A. JONES
AVI ALEX JACOBY,
Defendant.

The foregoing matter came before the court upon the State of Utah's Notice to Submit for
Decision pursuant to rule 4-501 (d) of the Code of Judicial Administration. The court having previously
received legal briefs and reply briefs from both parties, heard argument of counsel and fully considered
the record herein, the court now enters its
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FINDINGS OF FACT
1. The court finds that on December 2, 1985 a Virginia Order was entered that ordered the
Defendant to pay child support in the amount of $600.00 per month per child and spousal support in the
amount of $600.00 per month.
2. On May 21, 1986, another order was entered that denied the Defendant's petition to terminate
the spousal support award. However, there was a reduction in the total child and spousal support award
from $1,800.00 to $1,200.00 per month.
3. The Virginia Court entered the final Divorce Decree on July 24, 1987. The Decree, made
pursuant to a stipulation of the parties on January 5, 1987, provided for child support in the amount of
$400.00 per month per child and spousal support in the amount of $400.00 per month.
4. The Stipulation forming the basis of the Decree of Divorce established: (1) the visitation
provisions and specified no reduction of support during those periods, (2) support arrears up to January
30, 1987, (3) spousal support arrears, and (4) the terms under which the spousal support would
terminate.
5. At the time of the entry of the Decree, the Virginia Court transferred jurisdiction of the
matters of child support and custody to the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County,
Pennsylvania.
6. On March 27, 1987, the Virginia court determined that the arrearage amount due at that date
was $8,200.00.
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7. On April 27, 1987, a Utah State Office of Recovery Services administrative judgment was
docketed and entered in the Third District Court, State of Utah. The amount of the judgment was
$8,200.00 and represented child and spousal support for the period from May 1, 1986 through March 31,
1987. The Defendant stipulated to the judgment.
8. Since the transfer of jurisdiction of the divorce issues to Pennsylvania, no changes have been
made to the child or spousal support awards.
9. The Defendant's ongoing spousal support obligation terminated with the month of September
1989 because the ex rel. Plaintiff, Robin Kirby remarried.
10. On April 25, 1997, ORS filed a Motion and Order to Show Cause pursuant to the Uniform
Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act seeking a judgment against the Defendant for support arrears in
the amount of $54,287.00 for the period from December 1985 through April 1997.
11. The Defendant was personally served with the Order to Show Cause on May 20, 1997.
12. A hearing on the Order to Show Cause was held on June 25, 1997 before Commissioner Lisa
Jones. The Commissioner certified the issues of the statute of limitations and the amounts due prior to
1989 for hearing before this court.
13. An evidentiary hearing was held on October 8, 1997 before this court on the issues of the
statute of limitations and the support amounts owing prior to 1989. The hearing was continued until
December 8, 1997 and the State's attorney and the Defendant were instructed to submit legal briefs
regarding the contested issues and the controlling law.

State of Utah ex rel. Robin Kirby v. Avi Alex Jacoby
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
Page 4

14. On October 22, 1997 the Defendant was served with a second Order to Show Cause, filed
under the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act, which sought a judgment for support arrearage in the
amount of $54,287.05 for the period from December 1985 through June 1997 and contempt for the
Defendant's failure to pay his support obligation.
15. The Defendant failed to appear at the second hearing and the issue of the Defendant's
contempt for failure to pay is support obligations was certified for hearing before this court.
16. The above facts support the court's finding that the Defendant in this case is a noncustodial
parent pursuant to a Decree of Divorce entered in the State of Virginia and that pursuant to several
orders, including the Divorce Decree, the Defendant is required to pay child and spousal support.
17. Based upon the legal briefs submitted in this case, the court finds that is has proper
jurisdiction over the Defendant and over the subject matter in the case.
18. The court finds that the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act ("UIFSA") is the controlling
law for this case.
19. Based upon the legal briefs submitted in the case the court finds that the State of
Pennsylvania has no statute of limitations for the recovery of child support and that this fact is
determinative of the support arrears owed by the Defendant.
20. Based upon the UIFSA Order to Show Cause, the affidavits and the support arrearage
computations submitted by the State, the court finds that the Defendant owes support arrearages in the
amount of $55,887.05 for the period from December 1985 through November 1997. Further, all other
statutory provisions sought in the Order to Show Cause are appropriate.

State of Utah ex rel. Robin Kirby v Avi Alex Jacoby
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
Page 5

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Based on the foregoing findings of fact, the court now concludes that, as a matter of law, it is
appropriate that the court's judgment and order should be entered consistent with and embracing
the foregoing findings of fact.
DATED this

*4

day of

H^VUtpc^

BY THE COURT:

d

WILLIAM BOHLING
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

1998.

ADDENDUM D

675N.E.2d390
(Cite as: 424 Mass. 214, 675 N.E.2d 390)
CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT DIVISION
OF ALASKA [FN1]
FN1. On behalf of Carol A. Brenckle.
V.

Pagel

to him, despite contention that mother consciously
chose to forfeit her rights to child support payments
by making no attempt to contact him for 13 years.
M.G.L.A. c. 119A, § 13(a, d).
**390 Mary O'Sullivan Smith, Rockland, for
defendant.

Joseph J. BRENCKLE, Jr.
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts,
Suffolk.
Argued Nov. 7, 1996.
Decided Feb. 6, 1997.
Child Support Enforcement Division of Alaska
brought action on behalf of Alaska resident to collect
unpaid child support payments from father residing
in Massachusetts. The Brockton Division of District
Court Department, David G. Nagle, J., entered
judgment against father. Father appealed. After
transfer from the Appeals Court, the Supreme
Judicial Court, Marshall, J., held that: (1) Uniform
Interstate Family Support Act (UIFSA) applied
retroactively to case; (2) UIFSA required no de
novo or independent review into whether father
owed child support before enforcing Alaska child
support order; and (3) defense of laches was not
available to father.
Affirmed and remanded.
[1] PARENT AND CHILD <®=>3.4(1)
285k3.4(l)
Uniform Interstate Family Support Act is remedial
statute not affecting substantive rights and, thus,
should be applied retroactively.
M.G.L.A. c.
209D, § 1-101 et seq.
[2] PARENT AND CHILD <®=>3.4(2)
285k3.4(2)
Uniform Interstate Family Support Act required no
de novo or independent review by Massachusetts
court into whether father owed child support before
enforcing foreign child support order. M.G.L.A. c.
209D, §6-601.
[3] PARENT AND CHILD <®=>3.4(2)
285k3.4(2)
Divorced father's failure to make child support
payments became vested as judgments by operation
of law, and thus defense of laches was not available

Edward J. DeAngelo, Assistant Attorney General,
for plaintiff.
Before WILKINS, C.J., and ABRAMS, LYNCH,
GREANEY and MARSHALL, JJ.
*215 MARSHALL, Justice.
This case raises questions about the relationship
between successive Massachusetts statutes for the
interstate enforcement of child support orders. The
child support enforcement **391 division of Alaska
brings the action on behalf of Alaska resident Carol
A. Brenckle (Carol Brenckle) to collect unpaid child
support payments from her former husband, Joseph
J. Brenckle, Jr. (Brenckle), a resident of
Marshfield.
On appeal, Brenckle challenges
findings of the District Court entered against him in
the amount of $107,365 as determined under a 1991
judgment of the Alaska Superior Court (Alaska
court) and enforced by the court below. We affirm
the judgment and remand this matter to the District
Court, where it shall be transferred to the Probate
and Family Court Department for such other
proceedings as may be necessary to enforce the
judgment.
We summarize the pertinent facts. The couple was
married on December 19, 1964, in California. In
1971, they moved to Alaska, where they had one
child, Joseph J. Brenckle, III (son), who was born
on July 16, 1974. In May, 1978, they filed a joint
petition for divorce which was granted by the Alaska
court on July 17, 1978.
Under the terms of the divorce agreement Carol
Brenckle retained custody of their son, and Brenckle
agreed to pay $500 each month for child support.
The divorce agreement provided that child support
would terminate when their son reached the age of
majority, [FN2] and that the expenses for the child's
education (preparatory school, college, and graduate
school) would be shared jointly by both parents.
The divorce agreement also provided for visitation
arrangements between Brenckle and his son.
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FN2. In both Alaska and Massachusetts the age of
majority is eighteen years of age. See Alaska Stat.
§ 25.20.010 (Michie 1996); G.L. c. 4, § 7, Fiftyfirst.

court entered judgment against Brenckle in the
amount of $75,000, with interest. He has not
challenged the validity of that judgment.
FN4. Alaska law provides that unpaid periodic
child support payments are judgments that become
vested when each payment becomes due, Alaska
Stat. § 25.27.225 (Michie 1996), and further
provides for procedures for the collection of the
past due payments by obtaining a judgment in the
amount owed. Alaska Stat. § 25.27.226 (Michie
1996).

Soon after the divorce—the record is not specific—
and in any event by January, 1979, Brenckle moved
to Massachusetts, while Carol Brenckle remained in
Alaska with their son. Brenckle made the required
child support payments *216 for several months
only. [FN3] It is undisputed that Brenckle made no
child support payments after December, 1979. He
stopped all payments at that time, he says, because
one support payment sent to Carol Brenckle at her
home address was returned to him marked
"unclaimed," and he "assumed" either that she
would contact him with a new address, or that "she
no longer intended to accept the checks because of a
changed and improved financial position." Brenckle
apparently made no effort to determine whether his
"assumption" was correct, or whether his support
payments could be sent to an alternative address,
such as the post office box mailing address listed by
Carol Brenckle in the divorce agreement.
According to Carol Brenckle, Brenckle had no
communication with their son after May, 1979.
Because she was financially able to support their son
with her own earnings, she did not pursue
enforcement of the delinquent child support
obligations until their son prepared to go to college.

On June 30, 1992, Carol Brenckle filed a petition in
Alaska under the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement
of Support Act (URESA), **392 Alaska Stat. §§
25.25.010-25.25.100 (since repealed), *217 seeking
to establish an enforcement order in Massachusetts,
Brenckle's home State. The Alaska court certified
the petition on September 18, 1992, and ordered it
transmitted to the child support enforcement division
of the Massachusetts Department of Revenue
(department).

FN3. The parties dispute the date of Brenckle's last
payment of child support. He asserts that he made
child support payments through December, 1979;
Carol Brenckle maintains that the last support
payment was made in May, 1979. Brenckle
submitted copies of several "return receipt"
certificates signed by Carol Brenckle in the last six
months of 1979, but there is nothing to indicate the
content of the mail she received. Brenckle's own
affidavit concerning his 1979 child support
payments is cursory and ambiguous. In any event,
Brenckle has not challenged the amount of the
judgment.

On November 16, 1994, the District Court judge
conducted a hearing on the merits of the case; no
testimony was received and, by agreement of the
parties, the matter was submitted on memoranda and
affidavits. On February 10, 1995, the judge found
Brenckle liable in the amount of $107,365, the
amount of the 1991 Alaska judgment with interest.
Brenckle appealed. We transferred his appeal here
on our own motion.

In 1991, when their son turned seventeen years old
and began to make plans to enter college, Carol
Brenckle filed an action in the Alaska court to
recover the child support arrearages owed to her
because she could not afford to support him in
college. [FN4] Brenckle was provided notice of
those proceedings and an opportunity to be heard,
but he did not enter an appearance or contest the
proceedings. On December 19, 1991, the Alaska

The petition was entered in the Brockton District
Court on June 8, 1993, and an order of notice was
issued by that court to Brenckle and served on him
in hand. On December 9, 1993, Brenckle filed his
answer to the petition, and on March 4, 1994, he
filed a motion to dismiss or for summary judgment.
The District Court denied his motion on March 16,
1994.

This case reaches us in unusual circumstances.
URESA, codified at G.L. c. 273A, this
Commonwealth's previous statutory mechanism for
issuing, modifying and enforcing interstate child
support orders, was repealed on February 10, 1995,
the same date that the judgment entered in the
District Court. At the same time URESA was
replaced by the Uniform Interstate Family Support
Act (UIFSA), codified at G.L. c. 209D, inserted by
St. 1995, c. 5, § 87. We consider first which law
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applies to this appeal.
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child support arrearages. He does not address any
of Alaska's UIFSA arguments.

UIFSA was approved by the National Conference
of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in 1992,
and has since been adopted by twenty-six States,
including Alaska and Massachusetts. [FN5]
9
U.L.A. 255 (Master ed. Supp.1996). See G.L. c.
209D; Alaska Stat. §§ 25.25.101 (Michie 1996). It
was developed to improve the two prior uniform
laws concerning enforcement of family support
orders, URESA and the Revised Uniform
Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act *218
RURESA). [FN6]
See Note, The Uniform
Interstate Family Support Act: The New URESA,
20 U. Dayton L.Rev. 425, 448 (1994). UIFSA
aims to cure the problem of conflicting support
orders entered by multiple courts, and provides for
the exercise of continuing, exclusive jurisdiction by
one tribunal over support orders. See Levy &
Hynes, Highlights of the Uniform Interstate Family
Support Act, 83 111. B.J. 647 (1995).
Under
UIFSA, once one court enters a support order, no
other court may modify that order for as long as the
obligee, obligor, or child for whose benefit the order
is entered continues to reside within the jurisdiction
of that court unless each party consents in writing to
another jurisdiction. See G.L. c. 209D, § 2-205;
Alaska Stat. § 25.25.205 (Michie 1996).
FN5. As a condition for receiving Federal funding
for Aid to Families with Dependent Children all
States are now required to adopt UIFSA by January
1, 1998. 42 U.S.C. § 666(f), inserted by Pub.L.
No. 104-193, § 321, 110 Stat. 2221.

FN7. Brenckle argues that his duty to support his
son terminated on July 15, 1992, when his son
reached the age of majority. See Apkin v.
Treasurer & Receiver Gen., 401 Mass. 427, 428 n.
3, 517 N.E.2d 141 (1988).
**393 The Massachusetts codification of UIFSA
refers to its predecessor URESA only once.
General Laws c. 209D, § 2-207(c) provides that any
URESA action that is "pending or was previously
adjudicated" in the District Court or Boston
Municipal Court Department "may be transferred to
the probate and family court department" by any
party or by a child support enforcement agency, and
that "[u]pon transfer" the provisions *219 of UIFSA
shall apply. G.L. c. 209D, § 2-207 (c). [FN8] It is
clear that the Legislature intended that all URESA
proceedings in the Commonwealth be moved to a
single trial department, and that all URESA
proceedings, whether pending or previously
adjudicated, be subject to the provisions of UIFSA.
This is consistent with the fundamental purpose of
UIFSA: to "create a uniform basis for jurisdiction
so that ... only one support order is in effect at any
one time," and to "limit the number of tribunals
having jurisdiction to modify a child support order."
1995 House Doc. No. 255 at 24.
We must
nevertheless resolve whether UIFSA can be applied
retroactively to this case.

FN6. The Commonwealth never adopted the
Revised Uniform Enforcement of Support Act. 9B
U.L.A. 91 (Master ed. Supp.1996).

FN8. We note that this subsection of UIFSA is not
part of the uniform law as drafted by the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws and was added by the Massachusetts
Legislature. See § 207 of UIFSA, 9 U.L.A. 278
(Mastered. Supp.1996).

The parties' submissions to the District Court
addressed their claims only under URESA, and we
assume that the findings of the District Court were
made pursuant to URESA. Alaska now argues that
UIFSA applies to this appeal, and that even if
URESA applies, the findings of the District Court
must be affirmed. The core argument advanced by
Brenckle is that the District Court was precluded by
URESA from entering a judgment against him for
child support arrearages, first, because at the time
the order was entered in the court below he owed no
duty of support to his child [FN7]; and second,
because URESA did not provide for the collection of

The retroactive application of a statute is a subject
we have addressed on many occasions. We have
applied the rule described in Hanscom v. Maiden &
Melrose Gaslight Co., 220 Mass. 1, 3, 107 N.E.
426 (1914): "The general rule of interpretation is
that all statutes are prospective in their operation,
unless an intention that they shall be retrospective
appears by necessary implication from their words,
context or objects when considered in the light of the
subject matter, the pre-existing state of the law and
the effect upon existing rights, remedies and
obligations.... It is only statutes regulating practice,
procedure and evidence, in short, those relating to
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remedies and not affecting substantive rights, that
commonly are treated as operating retroactively, and
as applying to pending actions or causes of action."
[1] It was the express intention of the Legislature
that UIFSA be applied retrospectively;
its
provisions govern any URESA action that is
"pending or was previously adjudicated." It is also
clear that UIFSA, like its predecessor URESA, does
not create a duty of support, [FN9] but rather
provides the procedural framework for enforcing
one State's support order in another *220
jurisdiction. As a remedial statute, and one not
affecting substantive rights, it is proper that UIFSA
should be applied retroactively. [FN10] HeinWerner Corp. v. Jackson Indus., 364 Mass. 523,
525, 306 N.E.2d 440 (1974), and cases cited. We
recognize that there are limitations to the extent to
which even procedural or remedial statutes will
operate retroactively. See City Council of Waltham
v. Vinciullo, 364 Mass. 624, 627, 307 N.E.2d 316
(1974); Martell v. Moffatt, 276 Mass. 174, 177
N.E. 102 (1931). We have examined Brenckle's
claims under both UIFSA and URESA; because we
conclude that none of his substantive rights is
impaired by proceeding under either statute, it is
particularly
appropriate
to
apply
UIFSA
retroactively in this case.
FN9. See Keene v. Toth, 335 Mass. 591, 593, 141
N.E.2d 509 (1957) ( "[URESA's] purpose is to
provide an effective procedure to compel
performance by a person who is under a duty to
support dependents in another State"). See also
Edwards v. Lateef, 558 A.2d 1144, 1147
(D.C.1989) (URESA does not "affect or amend a
substantial right," and is properly characterized as
remedial); Scully v. Schubert, 155 Vt. 327, 330,
583 A.2d 93 (1990) ("URESA has a remedial
purpose and should be construed liberally to
effectuate its objectives").
FN10. Alaska argues that "[i]t does not matter*
whether the District Court entered its order before
or after UIFSA was enacted and that "it does not
matter" that the action has not been "formallyH
transferred to the Probate and Family Court
department. In holding, as we do, that UIFSA
applies to these proceedings, we do not mean to
suggest that the procedural requirements of the
statute can be ignored. However, because the
District Court's finding was entered on the same
day that URESA was repealed, and because UIFSA
does not address specifically a URESA case
pending on appeal, we conclude that the transfer
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requirements of c. 209D, § 2-207 (c ) are not
violated in this case.
We turn now to consider whether the Alaska
judgment against Brenckle can be enforced **394
under UIFSA. We begin by recognizing that under
UIFSA the Alaska court had jurisdiction over
Brenckle to issue its 1991 judgment. The son is a
resident of Alaska, and Brenckle resided with him in
that State from his birth in 1974 until Brenckle
moved to Massachusetts. Under UIFSA personal
jurisdiction may be exercised by a State tribunal if
an individual resided with a child in that State.
Alaska Stat. § 25.25.201(3). See G.L. c. 209D, §
2-201(3). Moreover, as we noted before, Brenckle
has never contested the validity of the Alaska
judgment and does not do so now.
[2] Brenckle argues that before it could enforce the
Alaska judgment the District Court was required to
make an independent finding that he owed a duty of
support to his son. No independent finding is
required. Under UIFSA a support order issued by a
tribunal [FN 11] of another State may be registered
in a tribunal of the Commonwealth ("responding
tribunal," *221 § 1-101[17]) for enforcement. G.L.
c. 209D, § 6-601. The Alaska judgment is just such
an order. The procedure for registration is set forth
in G.L. c. 209D, § 6- 602. [FN12] Carol Brenckle
and the child support enforcement division of Alaska
have complied with all of the UIFSA registration
requirements, and provided all of the information
required to register the Alaska support order in
Massachusetts. Once registered, the Alaska order is
enforceable in the same manner, and is subject to
the same procedures, as an order issued by a
Massachusetts court. G.L. c. 209D, § 6-603 (b ).
UIFSA requires no de novo or independent review
by a Massachusetts court whether Brenckle owes a
duty of support to his son. Indeed, requiring an
independent finding of a duty of support when an
Alaska court has already made that determination
would impede and frustrate the purpose of UIFSA.
[FN13]
FN11. The UIFSA defines "[tlribunal" as "a court,
administrative agency, or quasi-judicial entity
authorized to establish, enforce, or modify support
orders or to determine parentage." G.L. c. 209D,
§ 1-101(22).
FN12. General Laws c. 209D, § 6-602, provides,
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in pertinent part: "(a ) A support order ... of
another state may be registered in the
commonwealth by sending the following documents
and information to the appropriate tribunal in the
commonwealth: (1) a letter of transmittal to the
tribunal requesting registration and enforcement;
(2) two copies, including one certified copy, of all
orders to be registered, including any modification
of an order; (3) a sworn statement by the party
seeking registration or a certified statement by the
custodian of the records showing the amount of any
arrearage; (4) the name of the obligor and, if
known: (i) the obligor's address and social
security number; (ii) the name and address of the
obligor's employer and any other source of income
of the obligor; and (iii) a description and the
location of property of the obligor in the
commonwealth not exempt from execution; and
(5) the name and address of the obligee and, if
applicable, the agency or person to whom support
payments are to be remitted, (b ) On receipt of a
request for registration, the registering tribunal
shall cause the order to be filed as a foreign
judgment, together with one copy of the documents
and information, regardless of their form."
FN13. It would also deny the court issuing the
support order the "full faith and credit" of its
judgment in violation of art. IV, § 1 of the United
States Constitution, and would violate the full faith
and credit of child support orders act, 28 U.S.C. §
1738B (1994), which requires the appropriate
authorities of each State to enforce child support
orders made by the initiating court of another
State, provided that the court had subject matter
jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction, and that the
parties had reasonable notice and opportunity to be
heard. Id. at § 1738B (c). The statute forbids
State child support enforcement authorities from
modifying another State's child support order
except in limited circumstances. 28 U.S.C. §
1738B (a)(2), (e) (1994).
Under UIFSA, a party contesting the validity or
enforcement of a registered order or seeking to
vacate the registration, has the burden of proving
one or more of the defenses *222 specifically
provided by G.L. c. 209D, § 6- 607. [FN14]
Brenckle has not articulated his claims as "defenses"
under UIFSA. Nevertheless, we have reviewed all
of the claims that he has made, both in the court
below and on appeal, as well as the record
supporting such claims, and conclude that none of
his **395 claims is sufficient to constitute a valid
defense under UIFSA. The Alaska child support
order must be enforced. G.L. c. 209D, § 6-608.

FN 14. These defenses are: "(1) the issuing
tribunal lacked personal jurisdiction over the
contesting party; (2) the order was obtained by
fraud; (3) the order has been vacated, suspended,
or modified by a later order; (4) the issuing
tribunal has stayed the order pending appeal; (5)
there is a defense under the law of the
commonwealth to the remedy sought; (6) full or
partial payment has been made; or (7) the statute
of limitations ... precludes enforcement of some or
all of the arrearages." G.L. c. 209D, § 6-607 (a ).
While we hold that UIFSA is the statute applicable
to these proceedings, we shall review each of
Brenckle's claims under URESA. We do so because
it is arguable that some of the claims he makes
under URESA could be viewed as defenses under
UIFSA.
Moreover, had URESA precluded
enforcement of the Alaska judgment, it is arguable
that the application of UIFSA to this appeal could
have affected Brenckle's substantive rights. We
conclude that his claims under URESA also lack
merit and that the District Court was correct in
finding that the Alaska judgment could be enforced
under URESA.
We turn first to consider again his argument that
the District Court was required to make an
independent finding that he had an existing duty of
support at the time of the Massachusetts proceedings
because URESA, unlike UIFSA, did require such a
finding.
For several independent and sufficient
reasons the court below was correct to conclude that
Brenckle did owe a duty of support that could be
enforced in Massachusetts under URESA. First,
URESA defined a duty of support as "any duty of
support imposed by law, or by any court order,
decree or judgement." G.L. c. 273A, § 1, repealed
by St. 1995 c. 105. The court order obtained by
Carol Brenckle in Alaska itself constituted a duty of
support, and the District Court could have so found.
Moreover, Brenckle's interpretation of his divorce
agreement is unpersuasive. The Alaska judgment
was obtained by Carol Brenckle before their son
reached the age of majority, and there was no
requirement under URESA that the child remain a
minor while the *223 custodial parent pursued the
father for delinquent support payments. In addition,
the divorce agreement specifically provided that
Brenckle would contribute to his son's college and
graduate school expenses, and it was for this very
purpose that Carol Brenckle was seeking support.
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[FN15]
FN15. Even in the absence of the express
agreement between the Brenckles, the District
Court could have found Brenckle liable under
Massachusetts law to support his son in college.
Our law provides that a "court may make
appropriate orders of maintenance, support and
education of any child who has attained age
eighteen but who has not attained age twenty-one
and who is domiciled in the home of a parent, and
is principally dependant upon said parent for
maintenance," and that a court may order support
for "any child who has attained age twenty-one but
who has not attained age twenty- three, if such
child is domiciled in the home of a parent, and is
principally dependent upon said parent for
maintenance due to the enrollment of such child in
an educational program." G.L. c. 208, § 28. The
District Court had the authority to order Brenckle
to make the payments to Carol Brenckle for the
support of their son.
Brenckle next maintains that the District Court
could not find him liable because URESA did not
provide explicitly for the payment of child support
arrearages. We do not agree. URESA provided
that the responding State, here Massachusetts, "may
order the respondent to furnish support or
reimbursement therefor" when presented with a
child support judgment of another State (emphasis
supplied). G.L. c. 273A, § 10. To pay for their
son's college expenses Carol Brenckle sought
"reimbursement" for the support that she had
provided to him over many years in the absence of
all support from his father. Although URESA does
not use the word "arrearages," there is nothing
talismanic about that term and Carol Brenckle was
fully entitled to invoke URESA to obtain
reimbursement for the support she alone had
provided to their son. See Tande v. Bongiovanni,
139 Ariz. 346, 348, 678 P.2d 531 (Ct.App.), affd.
in part, 142 Ariz. 120, 688 P.2d 1012 (1984).
Moreover, while URESA was in effect, the
Legislature established a child support enforcement
division within the department, [FN 16] which was
authorized to institute collection procedures for "all
arrearages" that had accrued against child support
payments owed pursuant to a judgment or support
order, including *224 URESA orders. G.L. c.
119A, § 6 (a ). [FN17] The Legislature **396
would not have granted such authority to the
department if it did not intend to compel payment of
arrearages sought under URESA.

FN16. See Title IV, Part D of the Social Security
Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C. § 654(6) (1994). G.L. c.
119A, inserted by St. 1986, c. 310, § 10B.
FN 17. On the repeal of URESA and the enactment
of UIFSA, G.L. c. 119A, § 6, was amended,
St. 1995, c. 5, § 62, and now provides procedures
for the enforcement of judgments or for the
enforcement of support or custody orders entered
under UIFSA.
Brenckle next argues that because Alaska did not
provide any support to Carol Brenckle it had no
standing to bring this action. He relies on § 5 of
URESA, G.L. c. 273A, § 5, now repealed, which
provided that "[w]henever any state or political
division thereof has furnished support to an obligee
it shall have the same right to commence
proceedings under this chapter...." While URESA
conferred on a State the ability to collect payments it
had made, such payments are not a condition
precedent for the right of the State to bring an action
against a delinquent parent. Massachusetts has a
strong interest in ensuring that child support
payments are made by the responsible parent.
Absent a specific statutory exception we decline to
conclude that the Legislature intended to create any
barrier to the collection of support payments.
[FN 18] Alaska was authorized to pursue this action
on behalf of Carol Brenckle.
FN18. We observe that Federal law requires State
child support enforcement agencies to provide
services to all constituents, regardless whether the
particular constituent receives financial assistance
from the State. 42 U.S.C. § 654(6) (1995). Under
prior Alaska law, its child support enforcement
division was authorized to administer and enforce
URESA, Alaska Stat. § 25.27.020(3), and was
required to provide services to any petitioner
seeking support pursuant to that statute. Alaska
Stat. § 25.27.020(7) (Michie 1996). Effective
January 1, 1996, Alaska is authorized by UIFSA to
follow the procedures set forth in URESA. Alaska
Stat. § 25.27.020(3) (Michie 1996).
The
Massachusetts child support enforcement division
provides the same services to aggrieved parties in
this Commonwealth. See G.L. c. 119A, § 6.
Finally, Brenckle argues that, because
Brenckle declined to request the assistance
Alaska child support enforcement division
time the marriage was dissolved, [FN19]
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precluded from seeking its assistance now. His
argument finds no support in the language of the
statute, and we are aware of no holding to that
effect.
FN 19. In their petition for the dissolution of their
marriage, the couple agreed that it was "not
necessary" for child support payments to be made
through the Alaska child support enforcement
division.
[3] *225 In addition to his claims under URESA,
Brenckle argues that his former wife is barred by
laches from pursuing him for unpaid child support
obligations because she "slumbered on her rights"
for thirteen years, made no attempt to contact him
for support payments, and because she "consciously
chose to forfeit" her rights to collect child support
payments from him. [FN20] We disagree. Because
Brenckle's failure to make child support payments
became vested as judgments by operation of law, the
defense of laches is not available to him. Capone v.
Caponi, 350 Mass. 766, 213 N.E.2d 924 (1966).
[FN21] Moreover, for more than fifteen years
Brenckle has failed absolutely to fulfil the duties that
he owes to his son. Even now Brenckle attempts to
relieve himself of all of his responsibilities to his
son, including the payment for his son's college
education to which he agreed at the time of the
divorce. We decline to hold that a child forfeits the
protection of one parent because the custodial parent
does not take immediate measures **397 to enforce
delinquent child support obligations.
FN20. Brenckle has never claimed that any statute

of limitations precludes this enforcement action.
As the statute of limitations is one of the defenses
recognized under UIFSA, we pause to note that no
such claim is available to him. The Legislature has
determined that a delinquent payment of child
support is "a judgment by operation of law." G.L.
c. 119A, § 13 (a ). This statute applied to URESA
and is now applicable to the provisions of UIFSA.
Id. Alaska law is to the same effect. Alaska Stat. §
25.27.225 ("A support order ordering a
noncustodial parent obligor to make periodic
support payments to the custodian of a child is a
judgment that becomes vested when each payment
becomes due and unpaid").
The statute of
limitations in Massachusetts for enforcement of
judgments is twenty years. G.L. c. 260, § 20.
However calculated, these proceedings were
commenced within the applicable time period.
FN21. See also G.L. c. 119A, § 13 (a ), (d ),
which provides that any payment or installment of
support implemented under UIFSA is entitled to
full faith and credit by the courts of this
Commonwealth. Federal law also requires that the
Commonwealth afford full faith and credit to child
support orders issued by other States. 28 U.S.C. §
1738B (a).
We affirm the judgment of the District Court. The
case is remanded to the District Court where it shall
be transferred to the Probate and Family Court
Department for such other proceedings as may be
necessary to enforce the judgment.
So ordered.
END OF DOCUMENT
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